This chapter introduces and examines the notion of “evidential fictive participants” and their grammatical expression in utterances of fictive interaction. It focuses on fictive direct speech constructions and draws on examples from the Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin and Russian. After presenting data from these languages the chapter suggests that through the notion of participants fictive interaction forms a framework for grammatical typology. This framework has both a strong philosophical and analytical foundation and allows for an integrated approach to grammatical categories based on their relation to the conversation frame.

**Keywords.** evidentiality, participant types, Russian, Ungarinyin, verbal categories

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*This chapter has greatly benefitted from perceptive comments by the anonymous reviewers, Caroline Gentens and, particularly, Esther Pascual and Sergeiy Sandler: thank you for extraordinary editorial support both with respect to structure and content. Any remaining errors are my own. For financial support I gratefully acknowledge ELPD grant IGS0148, AIATSIS grant G2011/7629 during the collection of the Ungarinyin data, and KU Leuven project GOA/12/007 during the preparation of this paper.*
1. Introduction

As Pascual (2014, pp. 83–112) demonstrates, fictive reported speech can conventionalize into a wide range of functions in the languages of the world. Consider the meanings in (1), summarized from Pascual (2014, p. 91), which in several languages can only be expressed using reported speech constructions (or constructions diachronically derived from (in)direct speech):

(1) a. mental states, desires, intentions, attempts;
   b. emotional states;
   c. causation, reason, purpose;
   d. states of affairs, future tense.

I will address these functions in reverse order: those in (1d) may be illustrated by (2), from the Bantu language Ila.

(2) [ mu-bwa a ambe [ a vhwe ] ] wa patila
    [ 1-dog 1:say:ANT [ it would come out ] ] 1:PST stuck

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1 I use the term ‘reported speech’ in the sense of Vološinov (1973). Although Pascual (2014) specifically addresses fictive direct speech, I remain non-committal regarding the direct-indirect speech opposition, since (at least) some fictive reported speech constructions (e.g. containing logophoric constructions, see Güldeman, 2008) cannot straightforwardly be classified as direct speech.
Although formally a reported speech construction, (2) does not represent an actual locution. Within the context of (2) the construction signals that the event presented in reported speech is “about to occur”. It reflects the temporal organization of the represented event, a function close to that of grammatical aspect (cf. Güldeman, 2008, p. 71ff). I will refer to this type of fictive reported speech constructions as *aspectual fictive interaction*.

The type of fictive interaction representing the functions in (1c) are illustrated by (3), from the Peruvian language Aguaruna.

(3) *nenatia [ [ kagati ] tusa ]*

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2 Throughout this chapter, I adjusted the punctuation of examples and indicated (fictive) reported speech constructions with a double set of square brackets: the inner set of brackets marks the (fictive) reported message, the outer set encompasses the entire construction including the matrix clause.

3 Instead of aspect, the meaning distinction in (3) may also be characterized as ‘tense’ (cf. Van der Voort, this volume). However, in this typological characterization, I prefer the more basic and inclusive category of aspect, since cross-linguistically, aspect is more frequently attested and assumed to be diachronically primary to tense. Also, for many languages the existence of a ‘pure future tense’ (as opposed to, e.g., a modal ‘intentional mood’) is contested.
One-hangs-it-up [ [ let-it-get-dry ] he-saying ]

‘He hangs it up in order that it will get dry (lit.: ‘while he says “let it dry”’)’ (Larson, 1978, p. 88)

Example (3) again shows a formal reported speech construction not reflecting an actual locution. The clause between the inner square brackets describes an intended purpose by the subject referent of the matrix clause (i.e. ‘he’ in ‘he-saying’). Most of the examples of fictive interaction expressing causation or purpose include some meaning of intention, encroaching on the functions in (1a), but I will refer to this (sub)type as causative fictive interaction in order to distinguish it from evidential fictive interaction to be introduced below.

The functions in (1b), emotional states, cover a range of subjective evaluations of an event or referent. I will call this type modal fictive interaction, and (4) represents an example from the Papuan language Usan.

(4) mi qei-qei [ mani [ umer-iner ] gamb ]
thing some-RED [ yam [ wilt-3s:UF ] say:SS ]
gitab ig-oun
abstain:SS be-1p:PR

‘We abstain from various things lest the yams wilt (lit.: ‘the yam says it will wilt’)’ (Reesink, 1993, p. 222)
The embedded fictive speech construction in (4) has an admonitive meaning: the speaker evaluates the “wilting event” as undesirable, but possible.

My claim for the examples (2–4) is not that the respective fictive reported speech constructions express aspect, causation, or modality in a strictly grammatical sense, simply because this would require a more careful consideration of their position within the grammar of each individual language. The categories in (1) are also not strictly exhaustive of all attested functions that elements within a reported speech construction can grammaticalize into (cf. Guldemann 2008, p. 397-477). However, each of these functions are well-attested (see Guldemann 2008; Larson 1973; Loughnane 2005; Reesink 1993; Saxena 1988; van der Voort 2002, this volume). Perhaps the most common semantic extensions of reported speech constructions are those listed as (1a): “mental states”, “desires”, “intentions”, “attempts” (Pascual, 2014). These are the functions I focus on in this chapter, and I call them evidential functions.

Evidentiality, as a morphogrammatical category (Aikhenvald 2004), is illustrated in (5) from the Papuan language Oksapmin.

(5) *jxe jə-xən mədəp ku tit it*

> then DEM.DST-across FROM woman INDF again

*apli-n-gwel*

*come-PFV-VIS/SENS.YESTP*

> ‘Then, another woman came from over that way {I saw}’ (San Roque and Loughnane 2012, p. 117)
Example (5) combines a given event and a visual/sensory evidential marker, which signals a seeing event. By uttering (5) the speaker brings the described event and the seeing event into the current speech event, which in the gloss is indicated by “[I saw]”, with a speaker-indexing first person pronoun and the past tense form.

Evidential markers may express seeing events, as in (5), or other sensory modalities (e.g. auditory or even olfactory), or conjecture/inference (Aikhenvald 2004). But the most important way in which humans acquire knowledge of described events is by being told about them. Example (6) from Ngiyambaa (Australian, Pama-Nyungan) illustrates a case of morphogrammatical evidentiality involving a saying event, a subtype of morphological evidentiality called reportative evidentiality (glossed by Donaldson as LING.EVID “linguistic evidence”).

(6) *Nindu-dhan* *girambiyi*

2sg.NOM-LING.EVID sick.PST

‘You are said to have been sick’ (Donaldson 1980, p. 276)

Example (6) presents the event “you are sick” and a saying event, which is introduced into the current speech event as a past event, reflected by the past tense.

As the descriptions of evidentiality for (5) and (6) illustrate, an evidential meaning consists of: a described event (e.g. something seen, inferred,
or talked about), a perception event (e.g. seeing, deducing, talking), and the current speech event. In the original formulation of this account, Jakobson (1957, p. 135) captures the analysis of evidentiality with this formula:

\[
E^nE^{ns}/E^s
\]

Here, E stands for “event”, n for “narrated”, s for “speech”, and the slash (/) represents some deictic relation. As example (5) demonstrates, calling the second event in (7) “narrated speech event” is perhaps too narrow in the face of current typological data, since it may involve other sensory or cognitive modalities (Kockelman 2004 suggests “source event”, San Roque and Loughnane 2012 adopt “perception event”). What Jakobson’s (1957) account shows, however, is that irrespective of the type of perception event, an evidential meaning has a general three-way event structure. Significantly, this is also essential to the meaning of reported speech. Whether expressed by morphological means, as in (6), or in multi-word constructions, as in periphrastic reported speech constructions, the three-way interaction between the described, the narrated, and the current speech event is key.

While a broad consensus exists among linguists that multi-word reported speech constructions express a meaning similar to that of morphological evidentials (e.g. Besnier 1993; de Haan 1999; Mushin 2000; Haßler 2002; Clift 2006; Cornillie 2009; Wiemer 2010; Munro et al. 2012; Spronck 2012),
it may not be immediately apparent how Jakobson’s formalization of evidentiality applies to *evidential fictive interaction*, i.e. reported speech expressing mental states, desires, intentions, and attempts, as in (1a). This is a task I now turn to: I examine the forms and meanings of fictive reported speech constructions expressing evidential meanings in the Aboriginal Australian language Ungarinyin and Russian. I seek to demonstrate some of the main semantic properties of evidential fictive interaction and its expression in these two unrelated languages.

In §2.1, I start with a case study of fictive reported speech in Ungarinyin. This language illustrates the full possible range of evidential meanings expressed by fictive reported speech constructions and shows a number of grammatical properties that distinguish fictive uses of these constructions from non-fictive ones. Section 2.2 focuses on one specific aspect of the Ungarinyin fictive reported speech construction, its discourse status, by considering discourse features of fictive reported speech in Russian. The analysis suggests that fictive reported speech in both Ungarinyin and Russian is more likely to be discursively secondary than factive reported speech. In §3, I seek to explain this observation as part of a larger, more comprehensive account of fictive reported speech. I propose that by explicitly acknowledging the participant structure inherent in the conversation frame, we are able to account for the attested features of evidential fictive interaction in relation to other types of fictive reported speech, such as aspectual and modal fictive interac-
tion. I also suggest that by further developing the connection between grammatical meaning and (dialogic) participant structures, we can establish fictive interaction as a model that is truly able to capture the socio-cognitive and interactional foundation of grammar.

2. Two case studies: Ungarinyin and Russian evidential fictive interaction

2.1 Ungarinyin fictive and factive reported speech constructions

Ungarinyin has a reported speech construction that is polysemous between reported speech, reported thought, and reported wishes or intentions (as first noted in Rumsey 1982 and Rumsey 1990), as well as what Pascual (2014) labels, attempts. As such, the Ungarinyin construction covers the entire range of fictive evidential meanings listed in (1a). More particularly, the verb in matrix clauses in Ungarinyin reported speech constructions may be translated as either say, think, or want. An example illustrating each of these translations is:

(8) [ [ ngurrba nyaɔ-ŋgaŋ-yi-minda ] aŋ-ma-ø jirri ]
‘He says: “I will hit her” or ‘He says that he will hit her’, or
‘He thinks: “I will hit her” or ‘He thinks that he will hit her’, or
'He wants to hit her’ (090813AJMJSMPDc, 00:09–00:10)\textsuperscript{4}

The situated meaning of a construction in (8) is normally disambiguated by the (discourse) context, but often has to be constructed dynamically by the hearer. There are, however, several grammatical clues to rely on. Regarding fictivity, I focus here on the specific opposition between speech and thought meanings and a \textit{want} interpretation (Pascual’s “desires”, “intentions”, “attempts”). As a shorthand, I refer to the \textit{want} interpretation as fictive, and the speech/though reading as “factive” reported speech, i.e. “non-fictive” (cf. also Rocha and Arantes, this volume).\textsuperscript{5}

Interestingly, the distinction between fictive and factive reported speech in Ungarinyin corresponds to a degree of conventionalization: the inherently fictive \textit{want} interpretation is more clearly constructionalized. Firstly,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{4} Example edited for clarity, the reference codes following the Ungarinyin recordings refer to my field recordings (see Spronck (2015b).
\item \textsuperscript{5} This binary opposition is, of course, a simplification. For example, Ungarinyin mythology often includes speech and thought attributed to objects and animals that (from an outside perspective) would have to be classified as fictive, or “fictional” (cf. Xiang, this volume). Rumsey (1990) argues, however, that the distinction between an actual utterance and a represented one is not highly valued in Ungarinyin linguistic ideology. I will focus on the maximally distinct interpretations in (8) to avoid quibbling over marginal examples; for a fuller discussion, see Spronck (2015b).
\end{itemize}
it is not available unless several grammatical conditions are met: the embedded clause in (8) must have a first person singular subject and a main verb inflected for future tense. For example:

(9) a. [[beja buri nyadmana ] budmara ]
    [[beja buri nyarr-ma-na ] burr-ma-ra ]
    [[ already be.full 1pl.EXCL-do-PAUC ] 3pl-do-PST ]
    ‘“The few of us are full now”, they said’ (100903-30NGUN, 00:14–00:17)

b. [[ngurr ngimanangka ] budmara ]
   [[ngurr ngai-yi-ma-nangka ] burr-ma-ra ]
   [[ hit 1sg-FUT-do-3sg.IO ] 3pl-do-PST ]
   ‘They wanted to hit it’ (090813AJMJSMPDc, 11:49–11:50)

In (9a) the inner bracketed clause has a first person exclusive plural, not singular, and hence the construction has to be interpreted as either reported speech or reported thought. Even if the subject of the matrix verb is plural, the subject of the embedded clause has to be singular in order for the want meaning to arise, as in (9b), which is further distinguished from (9a) by the future tense marker.

The fictive want interpretation of Ungarinyin reported speech constructions also shows a higher degree of syntactic integration between the two

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6 Except in optative and irrealis moods (viz. “in order to want” or “could (not) want”), where future tense cannot be marked in Ungarinyin.
clausal elements (Spronck 2015a, p. 174). There appears to be a prosodic distinction between the fictive and factive interpretations. For example, the plot of ten random pitch contours of reported speech examples in Figure 1a shows a reasonably consistent falling pattern. Constructions with a reported intentionality interpretation are prosodically more diverse and show a less distinct high-low pattern (see Figure 1b).

![Figure 1a. Ten pitch contours of Ungarinyin reported speech](image)

This is in concordance with the claim by Guerrero (2008) and others that cross-linguistically *say* and *think* constructions are syntactically more loosely integrated than *want* constructions.

This may correspond to a generally lower pitch height (cf. Rocha and Arantes, this volume), but my measure here is admittedly more impressionistic. The sound recordings were randomly selected from my corpus and represent spontaneous speech.
Finally, *want* constructions lack the expressive prominence that characterizes reported speech utterances. As Verstraete (2011) finds, a central function of reported speech is one of information structuring: in discourse, reported speech introduces those pieces of information that move a story along. Ungarinyin reported speech constructions with a reported speech (or thought) interpretation appear at prominent places in the discourse prominence (Spronck 2015b, ch. 5). Fictive reported speech constructions with a *want* interpretation are discursively secondary.

A convenient comparative measure to demonstrate this point is to observe their relative occurrence in subordinate clauses, a construction type specialized in introducing backgrounded information (Thompson 1987). Table 1 lists the functions of reported speech constructions in the largest published Ungarinyin narrative text, Coate (1966), and their occurrence in subordinate
clauses. Strictly differentiating the function of reported thought in Ungarinyin is often problematic, so the table lists an ambiguous category of reported speech/thought alongside a group of examples that are clearly intended as reported speech, but neither category appears in subordinate clauses for more than 17% of its total number of occurrences.

**Table 1.** Functions of framing constructions in Coate (1966) and their occurrence in subordinate clauses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th># IN TEXT</th>
<th># IN SUBORDINATE CLAUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech/thought</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naming</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7 (78%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The category of ‘naming’, a function that was not discussed above but that comprises reported speech constructions of which the embedded clause only consists of a name (“we call x Y”), has a slightly larger portion of its tokens occurring in subordinate clauses. The framing constructions expressing reported intentionality in the narrative, however, nearly all appear in subordinate clauses.
2.2 Prominence in Russian evidential fictive interaction

Unlike Ungarinyin, Russian has a multitude of reported speech constructions, including direct and indirect speech, and several strategies involving particles (cf. Padučeva 2010; Wiemer 2010). This suggests that the range of formal properties that can be associated with fictive direct speech is considerably larger than in Ungarinyin. However, in this section I limit the analysis to the final aspect observed in the previous section in Ungarinyin – discourse status – and examine its expression in fictive interaction in Russian. I consider the distribution of Russian fictive reported speech and factive reported speech in subordinate constructions, on the basis of a small sample of 127 reported speech constructions from the Russian National Corpus (RNC).\(^9\)

\(^9\) I constructed the sample by extracting reported speech from the general version of the RNC (http://ruscorpora.ru/search-main.html), which includes a variety of spoken and written Russian, and the (non-overlapping) corpus of spoken Russian (http://ruscorpora.ru/search-spoken.html). The examples included the particle \textit{tipa} within two sentence positions from an inflected form of the speech verb \textit{govorit’} ‘to say’ (imperfective aspect), which yielded a total of 97 tokens, of which 66 were target forms. These forms were matched with 66 random examples of “regular” direct speech from the RNC (during the annotation process 5 of these had to be discarded and the sample appeared to include one indirect speech construction), so the total of target direct speech constructions was 60 + 1 indirect speech construction. I did not include any examples of \textit{skazat’}, the perfective aspect counterpart of \textit{govorit’} ‘say’, and \textit{tipa} in order to eliminate aspect of the speech verb as a possible interfering value.
Using the annotation program ANALEC (Landragin et al. 2012), I coded all examples for clause type (main, coordinate, subordinate) and the factive/fictive distinction (FacDS, factive direct speech; FicLoc, fictive locution; FicRS, fictive reported speaker; FicAddr, fictive addressee).

The decomposition of fictive interaction into FicLoc, FicRS and FicAddr corresponds to the fact that the conversation frame typically involves a speaker, an addressee, and a locution. Obviously, it is not possible for only one of these elements to be fictive: if the speaker is a “conceptual reality” (Pascual 2014, p. 9), per implication so are the addressee and the locution, and no actual conversation is evoked. In this sense, fictive interaction is not a matter of degree: a locution is either presented as an actual speech event, or it is a conceptualization of a speech event that is not to be interpreted as having actually occurred.

It is, however, possible for either a fictive speaker, a fictive addressee, or a fictive locution to be explicitly presented as fictive, triggering a fictive interpretation of the entire construction, as in the examples in (10a), (10b), and (10c), respectively.

(10) a. Každaja čerta ee lica, každoe dviježenie govori-t.

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10 For further details and downloads, see http://www.lattice.cnrs.fr/Analec/.

11 The most powerful insight about the relevance of e.g. a fictive addressee for the interpretation of an utterance is Pascual’s (2002, 2014) analysis of rhetorical questions (i.e. not directed at an actual addressee) as examples of fictive interaction.
In (10a) the fictive speaker (FicRS) is a body movement, which clearly cannot produce an actual locution. Example (10b) contains a represented locution the current speaker cannot actually have overheard, casting himself as a fictive reported addressee/overhearer. In (10c) the Russian informal address term ty ‘you’, contrasting with the honorific pronoun vy ‘you (honorific/plural)’, is presented as a generic speech event, and not as a speech event that happened at any specific point in time. Hence, it is a fictive locution.
My initial intention had been to focus the analysis on examples with the particle *tipa*, since this construction represents what Buchstaller and van Alphen (2012) label a “new quotative”, similar to the English “She was like ‘What?’” or “He went ‘Get out of here!’”. These utterances are ambiguous between speech and thought attribution and may not even reflect an actual thought or locution at all: “*like […] creates only an example of something that could have been said or thought*” (Romaine and Lange 1991, p. 263; see Pascual 2014, pp. 115-140). Daiber (2010) points out that this is the exact function of the *tipa* construction in Russian, and Sergeeva (2010, p. 152) plausibly suggests that diachronically the *tipa* construction developed from the regular noun *tip* ‘type’ (of which *tipa* is the genitive form, i.e. ‘of the type’, cf. Krolák, this volume), to a phrase modifying a reported message (“*say something of the type p*”) to an evidential marker of speech. Non-literal representation does not necessarily involve fictivity, however. For example, in (11) *tipa* signals that the reported message “he is on *V kontakte* (a Russian social networking website)” is loosely worded by the current speaker, but it is still represented as an utterance that occurred in the real world.

(11) prosto pomn-ju mne kto-to govori-l
simply remember-PRS.1sg 1sg.DAT someone.SPEC say-PST.m
čto tipa An’ on est’ “V kontakte” a ja s
COMPL TIPA Ann 3msg be.INF in contact.LOC but 1sg with
nim ne by-l-a na odnaj smen-e
3msg.COM NEG be-PST-f in one.OBLQ shift-LOC
‘I just remember someone said to me, something like, “he’s on V kon-takte”, but I never even had a shift with him’

(Anna, 19 yrs, conversations of Moscow students, 2007, RNC-spoken)

Despite marking the reported utterance in (11) as an approximate representation of the reported speech, the speaker does present it as a speech event that took place.12 This is not the case in (12), in which tipa introduces a reported message that the speaker presents as entirely imaginary.

(12) Ja ne pomn-ju čto ja togda govori-l-a

1sg NEG remember-PRS.1sg COMPL 1sg then say-PST-f
–čto-to tipa- oj, syn-a nel’zja!
something-DEF TIPA oy son-GEN forbidden
‘I don’t recall I was saying something like “Oh no! It must not be a son!” back then’

(Internet forum: Fizičeskoe nakazanie: “za” i “protiv”, 2007.01.05, RNC-general)

If the discourse status of fictive interaction in Russian parallels that in Ungarinyin, it can be expected that reported speech constructions with a fictive

12 This shows that reported speech constructions with tipa may be either factive of fictive. In the sample, the fictive interpretation appeared to be as frequent for tipa-marked constructions as for regular direct speech constructions, with FicLoc making up nearly 17% of occurrences (16.67% for direct speech, 16.95% for tipa-constructions). This finding is consistent with the variety Pascual (2014, pp. 115–140) finds with respect to fictivity in English “new quotatives”.
interpretation occur more frequently in subordinate clauses than factive reported speech constructions. This indeed appears to be the case, at least for one specific type of fictive direct speech construction (see Table 2).

Table 2. The distribution of Russian factive and fictive direct speech over clause types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th># TOTAL</th>
<th># IN MAIN CL</th>
<th># IN COORD CL</th>
<th># IN SUB CL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FacDS</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>51 (63%)</td>
<td>26 (32.1%)</td>
<td>4 (4.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FacIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FicLoc</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FicRS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19 (76%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows an interesting dichotomy between the distribution of reported speech constructions with a factive direct speech interpretation (FacDS) and fictive reported speaker (FicRS) on the one hand and a fictive locution (FicLoc) on the other. The latter type of fictive interaction is significantly more frequent in subordinate clauses than FacDS or FicRS.

There are at least three questions raised by the observations above. First, why would lower discourse prominence be associated with (certain types of) fictivity? I suggest two answers to this question, one that is rather trivial and one with broader ramifications for understanding the relation between (fictive) representation and grammar. A second, less consequential,
question concerns the difference between the properties of FicRS and FicLoc in Table 2. Although the Russian observations are impressionistic and need to be tested against a larger sample, I suggest that the distinction between FicRS and FicLoc is less surprising than it may seem at first sight, and that it highlights a specific aspect of the evidential meaning of fictive interaction: it offers insight into the conceptualization of the conversation frame. The evidential meaning is also related to the third question I aim to answer: how do the properties of evidential fictive interaction relate to those of non-evidential types of fictive interaction in section 1?

Each of these questions opens up directions for studying fictive direct speech in grammatical typology, as a phenomenon that shapes grammar in multiple and predictable ways. As Pascual (2002, 2014) demonstrates, fictive interaction pervades language at any structural level. Apart from being embedded in a philosophically coherent, radically socio-cognitive view of language (see Sandler, this volume), it also engenders an alternative, profoundly interactional approach to grammatical categories. Taking evidential fictive interaction and the aforementioned questions about prominence, fictivity, and grammatical contextualization as a point of departure, I sketch this framework in broad strokes in section 3.
3. **Participants stepping out of the shadows**

If we apply Jakobson’s (1957) model of evidential meanings (i.e. a narrated event and a narrated speech event in relation to a current speech event) to fictive interaction, we might adapt the formula in (7) as in (13).

\[(13) \text{E}^n\text{E}^{fs}/\text{E}^s\]

This is evidential fictive interaction: some content talked about (E\(^n\)), a current speech situation (E\(^s\)), and a fictive speech event (E\(^{fs}\)). A fictive evidential meaning does suggest the triple event structure that is a defining feature of the evidential meaning, but presents the narrated speech event as only existing in the mind of the current speaker.

While the observations in §2.2 can merely be taken as a first indication, the distinction between fictive locutions and fictive speech participants signaled above may explain why constructions classified as FicRS and FicLoc would not form a homogeneous class: fictive reported speakers are conceptualized as speakers nonetheless, whereas fictive locutions need not represent *speech*, but rather beliefs, intentions etc., and can therefore cast the implied fictive “speakers” involved in the event as referents who think, want, cause, etc. For example, in (10a) the bodily movement is cast as a speaker. In (12), on the other hand, the phrase *ne pomnju čto ja togda govorila* “I don’t
remember saying then” suggests a fictive locution and the participant involved, “I”, can be understood as merely thinking or wishing the content of the fictive locution. While a reported speech construction introducing a fictive locution (at least diachronically) suggests a speech event, it does not necessarily cast its participants as fictive *speakers*.

The distinction may also explain why discourse prominence would be related to the interpretation of the fictive speech event, but in order to demonstrate this we will have to dig deeper into the evidential meaning of reported speech constructions. Why would a reported speech interpretation be more prominent in discourse than, for example, reported thought or, in the case of Ungarinyin, reported intentionality? My suggestion for why this would be the case brings us to an aspect of evidentiality that is concealed in the representations in (7) and (13), but that is vital to its meaning: each event involved in the evidential meaning includes referents, participants in the event, which are interpreted against the background of the ongoing discourse.
Figure 2 brings out these “hidden participants” inherent in the evidential meaning: the terms “narrated event”, “narrated speech event”, and “speech event” indicate that evidentiality involves the interaction of three events. But, more importantly, these events represent particular types of interaction between participants. Factive reported speech necessarily involves the participants in Figure 2: the referents described in the reported message, the discourse participants in the reported speech event (at least a speaker and a hearer), and the discourse participants present in the current speech event (again, at least a speaker and a hearer, or, more appropriately, an addressee). Fictive reported speech constructions involve the same basic participant structure as factive reported speech constructions, but with slight

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13 The referents at the level of the narrated event, the narrated speech event, and the current speech event in Figure 2 are labeled, with an increasing degree of specificity, “participants” (i.e. any entity that can be referred to in the narrated speech event). “speaker” and “hearer” (i.e. any participant speaking or (over)hearing the narrated speech event) and “speaker” and “addressee” (i.e. any participant who produces the locution in the current speech event and to whom the locution is directed). For simplicity, I will only assume that “addressees” are a necessary participant
modifications. For example, fictive interaction with a reported thought or reported intentionality interpretation invokes the same three-part event structure as above, but in the narrated speech event the interactional aspect, indicated by the addressee/hearer, is absent. I propose that this absence accounts for the difference in discourse status between factive (i.e. speech-representing) and fictive (i.e. non-speech-representing) interaction: the lower prominence in discourse, corresponds to a lower number of represented participants in the fictive speech event. Under this interpretation, evidential fictive interaction (and factive reported speech) includes evidential participants, which may be defined as follows:

- **evidential participants**: discourse participants who are represented as being involved in (one of) two events: the current speech event and some event being talked about (cf. Jakobson 1957, p. 135)

If participants are central to the interpretation of evidential meanings, i.e. the interpretation of regular reported speech and of evidential fictive interaction, what about the types of non-evidential fictive interaction introduced in section 1? Causative fictive interaction involves (at least) two of the entities alongside speakers, assuming the dialogue as the fundamental model of conversation, but obviously this representation can be extended (e.g. the presence of a possible overhearer in the current speech situation may affect the way in which the current speaker chooses to phrase the locution).
participating in the fictive speech event, coopted into the roles of causer and causee. For example, in (3) the fictive locution involves a participant who initiates the action of “letting it dry” (the reported speaker in the fictive reported speech construction), and the object participant in the narrated event (“it”) as undergoing the action. In modal meanings, the property of a participant having some perspective on the reported speech event is interpreted as a speaker attitude towards this speech, which, again, is a reinterpretation of the role of the participants involved in the constellation in Figure 2. In the modal fictive reported speech construction in (4) this recasting of participants involved the “hearer” of the fictive reported speech event “the yam will wilt” as an entity acknowledging the possibility of the narrated event (i.e. the yam wilting) and expressing an evaluation of that event (i.e. as undesirable) in the current speech event. The event structure of direct speech, contrasting the reported speech event and the current speech event, may also semantically bleach into a more general meaning of temporal order between (parts of) an event, as in aspectual fictive interaction. For example, in (2) the contrast between the fictive narrated speech event and the current speech event suggests a temporal sequence. The fictive current “reporting speaker” is cast as an aspectual participant, perceiving the event in question before and after it occurs.

The relation of each of these meanings to the conversation frame may explain

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14 See Spronck (2012) regarding evidential and modal meanings in reported speech constructions.
why and how direct speech constructions may grammaticalize into such seemingly distinct functions as modality, aspectuality/tense, and causation. The participant types involved in each of these meanings may be defined as:

- **referential participants**: participants being singled out and presented as objects of reference;
- **aspectual participants**: discourse participants from whose viewpoint an event is temporally represented (e.g. beginning, middle, or end of an event, or a combination of these or of multiple events; cf. Smith 2010);
- **modal participants**: discourse participants who are understood as the source of a mental attitude;
- **dialogic participants**: discourse entities in response to whom or in anticipation of whose views the respective utterance is made.

Of the above-listed participant types, dialogic participants are the most basic, but also the most complex. To quote Bakhtin (1986b, p. 120): “Dialogic boundaries intersect the entire field of living human thought”. Language is constructed across the boundaries of dialogue as every utterance re-
sponds to some other utterance and anticipates a response based on the assumed knowledge background of the addressee (also cf. Sacks et al. 1974).\textsuperscript{15}

According to some estimates, humans engage anywhere between 26\%–75\% of their waking lives in “inner speech”, using language in conversation with ourselves (Vicente and Martinez Manrique 2011, p. 211), which is a capacity that lies at the basis of our ability to reason, of evaluating conflicting arguments (Mercier and Sperber 2011). Irrespective of the eternal question of the relation between language and thought, all of our interaction with the world that we can talk about is mediated through some (imagined) representation of the words of others. This accounts for the pervasiveness of dialogic participants in linguistic expression, which several frameworks have begun addressing (Anscombe and Ducrot 1976; Nølke et al. 2004; Ducrot 2009; Du Bois 2007; 2014; Verhagen 2005). The insight that, e.g., rhetorical questions/commands and fictive direct speech both fall into the category of fictive interaction (see Pascual and Sandler, this volume), and that these forms can also conventionalize into other grammatical constructions (Jarque, this volume) shows the strength of the notion of dialogic participants in fictive interaction.

Evidential participants are in many ways the least complicated of the participant types, since they are most clearly associated with functions in the

\textsuperscript{15} “[T]he listener who understands passively, who is depicted as the speaker’s partner in the schematic diagrams of general linguistics, does not correspond to the real participant in speech communication” (Bakhtin 1986a, p. 69).
reported speech event and the current speech event. Nevertheless, their adoption in linguistic analysis through the category of evidentiality is relatively recent. Modality, evidentiality, tense, and aspect have all been described as deictic categories of some sort in the literature, but the explicit recognition of modal, evidential, and aspectual participants suggests a unified foundation for this analysis.

There are roughly three commonly accepted ways in grammatical accounts in which linguistic structure may signal the existence of entities occurring in the discourse, whether they are people, things, marsupials, concepts, etc.:

- As morphological/lexical clause participants: associated with semantic roles; normally expressed by (bound) (pro)nominial constructions, occasionally affixed with case forms;

- As syntactic clause participants: the macro-roles subject, object, and indirect object/oblique; signaled grammatically by e.g. word order and verbal agreement;

- As indexical participants: any discourse entity whose existence is signaled by a construction, prosodic element, or the speech situation itself (cf. Silverstein 1976, p. 29).
Traditionally, linguistic analysis has focused on how referential participants are mapped onto morphemes, lexemes, or syntactic roles,\textsuperscript{16} which has both led to the exclusion of other participant types and of more unexpected forms of grammatical expression. Systematically examining the relation between each of these functional and structural participant types, as constructions of (clausal) fictive interaction force us to do, establishes a framework for the analysis of grammatical categories that acknowledges the primacy of the conversation frame.

Irvine (1996) argues that it is impossible to reduce a speaker to a single speaker role at any point in the conversation. Every utterance is set against the background of some communicative situation, “shadow conversations”, which it responds to, interacts with, represents parts of. This conceptualization of language corresponds to Bakhtinian dialogue. Systematically charting the functions and structural expression of participants in relation to the conversation frame in grammar allows the shadow conversationalists to step forward and be recognized for their central contribution to grammar.

4. Conclusions

\textsuperscript{16} This domain is commonly referred to as “semantic alignment” (i.e. the expression of a semantic role through a linguistic structure), for an overview see Donohue and Wichmann (2008). While semantic alignment rightly forms a core topic in linguistic typology and descriptive grammar, I would argue that the level of scrutiny dedicated to the semantic roles of referential participants should be extended to the types of participants introduced in this chapter.
In this chapter, I sketched an approach to grammatical categories in relation to aspects of the conversation frame, by examining properties of evidential fictive interaction in Ungarinyin and Russian. I observed that in Ungarinyin fictive interpretations were more structurally conventionalized and that they more often were less prominent in discourse. A trivial conclusion that can be attached to this observation is that there is a causal connection between these, since a more grammaticalized meaning is inherently discursively secondary (Boye and Harder 2012). This conclusion does not satisfactorily explain, however, why a similar observation about discourse status applies to Russian, in which a fictive interpretation is not associated with stronger constructionalization. My typological hypothesis, based on the analysis, is that less typical evidential participants (or non-evidential participants) in fictive interaction are more likely to be discursively secondary in the languages of the world.

Fictive locutions have a wide range of metaphorical extensions, which would explain the observed distinction in the Russian data between the properties of fictive direct speech representing, e.g. an inanimate object or concept as a speaker and representing a locution as a thought (the most distinctive fictive interpretation in Russian) or, for instance, an intention (the most distinctive fictive interpretation in Ungariniyn). Fictive locutions include non-prototypical evidential participants (e.g. a thinking rather than a speaking entity), or coopt the participants projected by the evidential meaning into non-evidential functions. These non-evidential participants I have labeled modal participants in the case of modal fictive interaction, aspectual participants, for
aspectual fictive interaction, and referential participants for causative fictive interaction. I suggest that since each of these non-evidential participant types can be derived from the participant structure of the evidential meaning, the evidential meaning is diachronically primary in the grammaticalization of fictive reported speech. This is a hypothesis, however, that needs to be tested in more detail in the relevant languages. I hope that the categories presented here provide a viable framework for further investigating the development of participant types in evidential and non-evidential fictive interaction and for gaining a fuller understanding of the relation between them.

References


