Stance as participant structure:
A Jakobsonian approach to the pragmatics and semantics of evidentiality

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Jakobson (1957) bases the analysis of mood on a three-part structure that crucially involves two participant variables. Although the definition of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) differs in some fundamental ways, it also allows for the explanation of a participant structure inherent in evidential meanings. In this paper I argue that by exploring the interaction between these participant structures in multiple-perspective constructions and in reported speech, the framework proposed in Jakobson (1957) enables us to systematically examine phenomena that are typically assumed to arise in evidential expressions as pragmatic effects, particularly commitment effects and evidential interpretations of modals. I propose that this approach present us with a principled account of stance meanings (Du Bois 2007), more particularly, of the semantic and pragmatic interaction between modal and evidential meanings, based on their semantic structure.

1 Introduction

Although in recent years the majority view about the status of evidentiality and epistemic modality appears to have settled in favour of conceptualising the two as separate categories (Cornillie, 2009), they undeniably share strong links. Cross-linguistically, constructions as in (1a), combining an evidential and an explicit modal meaning, are increasingly attested (San Roque and Bergqvist, 2015). However, the typological tendency of evidential constructions to display ‘modal effects’ (as in (1b)), or of evidential interpretations to arise with purportedly modal elements (as in (1c)) still represent more familiar cases of the connection between evidentiality and epistemic modality.

(1) a. A fisherman has been seized by the monster Kajurku, who appropriates his bark torch, which the victim’s companions see from the shore:
   kurru-ja manharr-iy maraka dangka-karran-ji
   see-ACTUAL torch-ACTUAL.OBJECT PRT man-GEN-ACTUAL.OBJECT
   birra niwan-ji
too his-ACTUAL.OBJECT
   ‘(They) saw a bark torch, and wrongly thought it was the man’s, that it too was his’ (Evans, 2006: 108)

b. He said it is a good book [intended: ‘He said so, but I doubt it’].
c. It must be a great book [intended: ‘Allegedly, it is a great book’].

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In (1a), from the Australian Aboriginal language Kayardild, the particle maraka ‘wrongly thought’ combines the evidential meaning ‘x thinks/says that p’ and the modal meaning ‘I evaluate p as untrue’. I examine this type of construction and the contribution of evidentiality in detail in Section 3, but at this stage I simply posit that both meanings are indeed required for a successful understanding of (1a): evaluating p as wrong only makes sense if the speaker presents p as content that was asserted (or inferred to be believed) by the implied grammatical subject of (1a), translated as ‘they’. Therefore, the evidential meaning is a necessary semantic component of the particle maraka ‘wrongly thought’. The particle combines this with a second meaning, however: it can only be used if the speaker does not subscribe to the truth of p, i.e. it also has an evaluative epistemic meaning.

The interpretation of (1a) appears close to that of the English (1b), but few would argue that the modal interpretation here is semantic. In (1b), by stressing the speech verb, the implicature arises ‘I am merely reporting p as asserted content by the subject referent of the main verb, but do not commit to the truth of p’.

Finally, in (1c) the epistemic modal interpretation of ‘must’, i.e. ‘I am reasonably certain that p is the case’ necessarily combines with the evidential interpretation ‘I infer p’ or ‘I have been told that p’ (cf. the analysis of the Dutch equivalent moeten ‘must’ in Cornillie 2009: 54–57).

In this paper I propose that ‘multiple-perspective constructions’ as in (1a) display a semantic structure that is helpful for explaining the ‘pragmatic’ effects in (1b) and (1c). I suggest that the definitions of mood and evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) are central to the semantic structure of the examples in (1). In Section 2.1 I begin by introducing these definitions, and argue that Jakobson’s (1957) discovery that person plays a central role in the analysis of mood, is implicit in his definition of evidentiality as well. In order to fully capture the interaction between the two categories, this implicit assumption has to be drawn out. Section 2.2 discusses a proposal in Kockelman (2004) that equally applies Jakobsons (1957) model to multiple-perspective constructions and evidential/modal implicatures. The section aims to demonstrate that, while Kockelman (2004) makes several valuable suggestions, the model he proposes obscures rather than elucidates the semantic regularities underlying both phenomena, and that these semantic features are already inherent in Jakobson’s original model.

In Section 3.1, I apply the model based on Jakobson (1957) to multiple-perspective constructions in Australian Aboriginal languages and, more particularly, to expressions of mistaken belief as in (1a). Similarly, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 discuss how the model applies to implicatures arising from evidential and modal elements, respectively.¹

Section 4 connects the proposed formalisation with the definitions of stance in (Du Bois, 2007) and argues that the proposed framework allows us to explicate the strong connection between meanings in the stance domain Du Bois (2007) describes. The section presents a brief conclusion and suggests some ways in which the proposed model can be further applied.

¹The discussion in 3.3 does not address the question of whether moeten ‘must’ is in fact primarily an evidential or a modal word (cf. Nuyts et al., 2010). The formula in Jakobson (1957) allows us to circumvent this problem, since both approaches (i.e. whether the evidential meaning arises from epistemic modal must or whether the modal epistemic meaning arises from evidential must) would lead to the same analysis.
2 Reinterpreting Jakobson (1957)

Roman Jakobson’s (1957) *Shifters, verbal categories and the Russian verb* notably popularised the concept of ‘shifter’ (Jespersen 1922: 123–124; also see Fludernik, 1989), but the paper was also innovative in two other respects: first, it proposes that the category of ‘mood’ is crucially defined by the involvement of a participant variable, and, second, it demonstrates the relevance of the category of evidentiality by developing a semantic account that can be applied to both languages containing a morphological evidential category (cf. Aikhenvald 2004) and periphrastic structures expressing a similar meaning (cf. Diewald and Smirnova, 2010). In Section 2.1, I propose that the definition of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) implicitly parallels that of mood more fully than is immediately apparent on the basis of the original formulation. In Section 2.2, I consider a proposal by Kockelman (2004), reformulating some of Jakobson’s (1957) notions in order to account for multiple-perspective constructions and modal implicatures. I argue that the original proposal in Jakobson (1957) is superior to the reformulation in Kockelman (2004), but only if Kockelman’s (2004) objections to Jakobson (1957) are suitably dealt with and if multiple-perspective constructions and modal implicatures are not represented as the expression of one single grammatical category, but of two: Jakobson’s (1957) mood and evidentiality.

2.1 Mood and evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) as participant structures

Jakobson’s (1957) schematic representations of mood and evidentiality are shown in (2).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{MOOD} & : P^nE^n/P^s \\
\text{EVIDENTIALITY} & : E^nE^{ns}/E^s
\end{align*}
\]

In this formula, ‘E’ stands for ‘event’, the superscripts ‘n’ and ‘s’ stand for ‘narrated’ and ‘speech’, respectively, and ‘P’ denotes ‘participant’. The forward slash ‘/’ represents a non-contemporaneous relationship between participants or events, indicating the shifter character of mood and evidentiality. Let us start by examining the formula for mood according to Jakobson (1957: 135):

“[m]ood characterizes the relation between the narrated event and its participants with reference to the participants of the speech event: in Vinogradov’s formulation, this category ‘reflects the speaker’s view of the character of the connection between the; action and the actor or the goal.”

In (2a) this analysis is represented by a structure consisting of three components: the most traditional one of these is the ‘narrated event’ (E^n), which simply represents something talked about, which may be called a proposition or, perhaps more appropriately in terms of Potts (2005; 2007b) an ‘at-issue meaning’, ‘the content that speakers offer as primary and [...] that they are most expecting to have to negotiate with their interlocutors before it is accepted into the common ground’ (Potts, 2007b: 666). The narrated event involves participants (P^n), with whom the participants in the speech situation (P^s) semantically engage. More particularly, in

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2There exists a small but interesting literature devoted to elaborating or revising parts of the formalism in Jakobson (1957) (e.g. Mel’čuk, 1991; Aronson, 1991; Kockelman, 2004; Evans, 2006). To the extent that studies in this tradition adhere to the internal logic of Jakobson’s (1957) ‘calculus’, my proposal below should be consistent with the later accounts.

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the conditional irrealis construction in (3a), the narrated event 'he lives in freedom' (E\textsuperscript{n}) is evaluated by the narrated participant (P\textsuperscript{n}) as something that could potentially happen, but presented by the speaker (P\textsuperscript{s}) as something that has not happened. Similarly, the hortative construction in (3b), presents a E\textsuperscript{n} ‘writing’, a P\textsuperscript{n} as someone involved having to do the writing and the P\textsuperscript{s} speaker and addressee as participants ordering and being ordered to perform the E\textsuperscript{n}, respectively.

(3) a. žit’ by emu na vol-e, ne znat’ by pečal-i
live.INF IRR 3msg.DAT on will-LOC NEG know.INF IRR sorrow-GEN
‘If he could live in freedom, he would know no sorrow’

b. napiši-ka
write:IMPV:IMP-HORT
‘Write!’ (Jakobson, 1957: 139, glosses added)

Based on (3), questions remain as to the identity, type and exact number of participants represented by P\textsuperscript{n} and P\textsuperscript{s} for each example. But the variables in the representation of mood in (2a) can be populated with such notions as e.g. ‘modal judge’ (Potts, 2007a), ‘point of assessment’ (von Fintel and Gillies, 2008), and ‘modal source’ and ‘modal agent’ Verstraete (2001; 2005) in more modern analyses of epistemic and deontic modality. Each of these notions assumes the presence of one or more (attitudinal) entities. The framework in (2a) allows us to explicitly ask questions about the similarities between these entities in, e.g., epistemic and deontic meanings, whether some of the values represented by P\textsuperscript{n} and P\textsuperscript{s} may remain empty (cf. Verstraete, 2005: 1410), and how to separate between semantic entities in the generalised semantic representation of a modal meaning (P\textsuperscript{n}) and the situated instantiation of these (attitudinal) entities in the speech situation (P\textsuperscript{s}). For our present topic, it will be sufficient to acknowledge that the formula in (2a) can be used to characterise epistemic evaluations about the truth of an at-issue meaning at a moment that is not the current speech moment, and at the current speech moment.

Jakobson’s (1957) analysis of evidentiality contrasts with that of mood in several important aspects, most importantly, by treating it as one of the categories abstracting from the participants’, ‘characteriz[ing] [...] its relation to another narrated event (E\textsuperscript{n}E\textsuperscript{n})’ (Jakobson, 1957: 134). The formulation ‘abstracting from the participants’ is important here, since, obviously, an evidential meaning does crucially involve at least one ‘evidential participant’, i.e. the entity involved in viewing, hearing, inferring etc. the at-issue meaning.\footnote{See San Roque et al. (2015), who, in referring to this role, cite notions from the literature such as ‘observer’, ‘experiencer’, ‘evidential origo’ and ‘witness’. The treatment of this role in Speas (2004) is especially interesting; this author treats the witness as a full-blown argument in the syntactic structure. Note that both the debate about the status of this role and the lack of agreement about how to call it entirely parallels the terminological discussion about ‘attitudinal sources’ in the literature on modality.}

Consider the evidential examples in (4), from the Papuan language Oksapmin.

(4) a. jaxe uxe iŋ tit tabubil jo-xət
so 3SG.F.POSS string.bag INDF PN DEM.DST-up
wə=m-ti-p=li
leave=do(TR)-PFV-PCP.FP.SG=REP
‘So she has left her bag up at Tabubil {I was told she did it}.’ (San Roque and Loughnane, 2012: 113)
b. *tom xulu jox oksapmin ma-xom pt-nipat*
   water pond DEF PN DEM.PRX-down be-VIS/SENS.FP.SG.hab
   ‘There was a pool down at Oksapmin station {I saw}.’ (San Roque and Loughnane, 2012: 123)

According to the representation in (2b), the reportative evidential meaning in (4a) can be decomposed into the narrated event \(E^n\) ‘she left her bag up at Tabudil’, a narrated speech event \(E^{ns}\) in which the current speaker was told/overheard that the \(E^n\) occurred and a speech event \(E^s\) in which the current speaker relates the \(E^n\) as presented in the narrated speech event \(E^{ns}\). Similarly, in the visual/sensory evidential meaning in (4b), the \(E^n\) ‘there is a pool at Oksapmin station’ is presented as an \(E^{ns}\) in which the \(E^n\) was visually observed and an \(E^s\) in which the current speaker presents the \(E^n\) as a visually based \(E^{ns}\) to the addressee. Since a \(E^{ns}\) in evidential meanings as in (4b) does not involve speech, Kockelman (2004) suggests to rename it as ‘source event’ and San Roque and Loughnane (2012) adopt ‘perception event’, but the basic framework of the three-partite structure in (2b) applies in all cases. Taking into account the realisation that the event structure in Jakobson’s (1957) evidential meaning involves abstraction from participants, but certainly not absence of participants\(^4\) I will provisionally reformulate the schematic representation in (2b) as in (5).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(5) } & \ E^nP^{E^{ns}}/P^{E^s} \\
\text{EVIDENTIALITY}
\end{align*}
\]

The representation in (5) makes explicit two assumptions about the semantics of evidentiality that may not be obvious from the formula in (2b): first, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the level of abstraction involved in the participant structure in \(E^n\) as opposed to the other two events: \(E^p\), the at-issue meaning, will typically involve represented participants in the form of, e.g., verbal arguments, but these are not essential or distinctive for the evidential meaning. For example, in (4a), the lexical object *uxe iyt tit ‘her bag’, the location *tabubil joxat ‘up at Tabubil’ and the bound subject on *wa=m-ti-p=li ‘she left (it)’ are not required for establishing the evidential meaning. This can be clearly shown by the Cuzco Quechua reportative evidential construction in (6) cliticising on the non-valent construction *para-mu-sha-sqa ‘(it) was raining’ (compare the bound subject pronoun on *riku-ra-ni=chu ‘I didn’t see’).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(6) } & \ Mana riku-ra-ni=chu para-ta chayqa para-mu-sha-sqa=s \\
& \text{not see-1-PST-1=NEG rain-ACC then rain-CISL-PROG-NX.PST=REP} \\
& \text{‘If I didn’t see it rain, then it rained reportedly’ (Faller, 2012: 292)}
\end{align*}
\]

For this reason, \(E^n\) is shown without a participant variable in (5).\(^5\) For the definition of evidentiality the participants involved in \(E^n\) are not required.

Second, there is also a fundamental asymmetry between, on the one hand, the participants involved in \(PE^{ns}\) and \(PE^s\) in (5), and the participants defining mood in (2a) on the other. The

\(^{4}\)For a more elaborate discussion of this point, see Spronck (forthc.).

\(^{5}\)Note that this absence does not mean that participants in the \(E^n\), when present, may not interact with participants in the \(E^{ns}\) or \(E^s\). For example, in case of co-referentiality, notably with first person singular subjects in the \(E^n\), ‘indirect’ evidentials, i.e. evidential meanings indicating that the \(PE^{ns}\) did not directly witness the \(E^n\), become unavailable or undergo a change in meaning (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004: 220ff.). As Rumsey (1990) and McGregor (2007) point out, in languages in which reported speech constructions can be interpreted with an intensional/desiderative meaning (‘want’) this interpretation is often restricted to the presence of a first person singular subject referent in the \(E^n\) (also see Spronck 2015).
relation involved in $P^aE^n$ in (2a) is a simple relation between the at-issue meaning $E^n$ and the $P^n$. The participant value in $P^E^n$, however, does not just stand in a relation to the at-issue meaning $E^n$, but also to the $E^n$: while the $P$ value in (2a) signifies that a participant relation exists between the attitudinal source and the at-issue meaning, the $P$ values in (5) signal both that and how the witness is involved (i.e. as part of a speech event, a viewing event, a feeling event etc.). These distinctions will prove significant for the discussion of modal effects in evidential constructions.

2.2 The participant structure in Kockelman’s (2004) commitment event

While the classification of verbal categories in Jakobson (1957) reveals fundamental properties of mood and evidentiality, not every semantic representation of a grammatical category proposed is equally convincing. This is particularly true for ‘aspect’ and ‘status’, which Jakobson (1957) both represents as $E^n$, a narrated event that is quantified (aspect) or qualified (status). I will limit the discussion here to the latter category.\(^6\)

Status, according to Jakobson (1957), ‘defines the logical quality of the event’. This includes elements under contrastive focus (e.g. not him, I did go), and (doxic) epistemic evaluations of an at-issue meaning, such as the factive marker $pe’$ in (7), from Q’eqchi’ (Mayan, Kichean).

\[(7)\]
\[
\begin{array}{lllllll}
\text{x-Ø-hulak} & \text{pe’} & \text{chaq} & \text{ewer} \\
\text{Perf-Abs(3s)-arrive} & \text{F} & \text{hither} & \text{yesterday} \\
\end{array}
\]

‘He did arrive yesterday’ or ‘He arrived yesterday!’ (Kockelman, 2004: 140)

Based on examples as in (7), Kockelman (2004) argues that the representation of status as ‘a narrated event’ $E^n$ is inadequate. In (7) a simple narrated event $E^n$ is presented by the verb $x-Ø-hulak$ ‘he arrived’, but the factive marker $pe’$ adds an evaluation of this event as one that the speaker commits to as having actually occurred. Kockelman (2004) labels this evaluation a ‘commitment event’ and consequently defines status as a deictic relation between a narrated event and a narrated commitment event: $E^n/E^{nc}$.

This reformulation of status offers several clear benefits: by conceiving of ‘commitment’ as a two-stage process, Kockelman (2004) captures the scope relations between the at-issue meaning ($E^n$) and the ‘qualifying’ element. The alternative representation ‘$E^n/E^{nc}$’ also removes the ambiguity inherent in the definition of status in Jakobson (1957) that $E^n$ may both represent an at-issue meaning and a modalised proposition. And Kockelman (2004) makes a novel claim about the deictic features of status: the proposed re-definition removes a basic distinction between mood and status in Jakobson (1957), by classifying both as (potential) shifters, i.e. as elements having a deictic relation with the speech moment (as symbolised by the forward slash ‘/’).

I agree with Kockelman (2004) that representing the factive evaluation in (7) as ‘$E^n$’ is insufficient. But I believe that taking the drastic step of adding an entirely new type of event to Jakobson’s (1957) calculus, of which it is unclear how it relates to the formalisation of other categories, is unnecessary. The meaning of (7), I would suggest, can be characterised as the at-issue meaning ‘he arrives’, a participant evaluating this at-issue meaning as, e.g., factive (the constant, semantic value of the evaluative meaning) and the current speaker participant.

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\(^6\)Similar objections can be raised to the treatment of aspect in Jakobson (1957), see Spronck (forthc.) for a discussion, following Smith (2010).

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evaluating the at-issue meaning as actually having occurred in the current speech event. Kockelman (2004: 142) implicitly confirms this interpretation: ‘Commitment events [...] turn on the relationship between participants’. More poignantly: ‘[D]isjunctures between commitment events often serve to index more complicated mental states such as surprise and doubt’ (Kockelman 2004: 142). In other words, if one participant is understood to evaluate the at-issue meaning differently from the other participant (e.g. true against false), the resulting interpretation is a complex modal meaning. Note that the only variables required to represent this meaning are $E^p$, the at-issue meaning, $P^p$, the semantic evaluative meaning and a relation to the participant who is understood to make the evaluation in the current speech event, $/P^s$. These are the variables in the representation of mood in (2a): ‘$P^nE^p/P^s$’.

By interpreting the meaning of examples as in (7) as expressions of Jakobson’s (1957) mood rather than status, it becomes unproblematic to account for their semantic features. This ‘mood structure’ is not the only type available for representing complex mood meanings: I propose there are two, as represented in (8). The representation in (8a) simply restates the definition of mood (the order of the internal elements have been slightly changed in order to align the P-values on both sides of the deictic relation ‘/’, but this should not affect the interpretation). The second type is shown in (8b) and pairs a modal meaning to an evidential one. My suggestion is that many multiple-perspective constructions and evidential/modal implicatures invoke the structure as in (8b). In the next section I will explore this proposal in more detail.

(8) a. $E^p \quad P^n \quad /\quad P^s$ 
   $P^{E^n} \quad p^{E^s}$

b. $E^p \quad /\quad P^n \quad /\quad P^s$

3 An application of Jakobson’s (1957) calculus to complex modal meanings

3.1 Multiple-perspective constructions in Australian Aboriginal languages

Evans (2006) introduces the notion of ‘multiple-perspective constructions’, construction types in which the perspective of the current speaker only partially corresponds to that expressed by the construction as a whole. Assuming that a perspective can only be meaningfully interpreted if it is attributed to a person, and that multiple-perspective constructions therefore involve at least two person values, we may provisionally assume this consists of the structure in (9).

(9) P P

Two examples of constructions that combine the perspectives of two separate ‘persons’ are shown in (10). The Dalabon example in (10a) contains the suffix molkkun ‘unbeknownst’, which indicates a knowledge asymmetry between the speaker and some other discourse entity. The Mparntwe Arrernte (10b) has the suffix -kathene ‘mistaken belief’, which signals that a belief that some represented discourse entity holds or held is presently asserted by the speaker to be untrue.

(10) a. kardu ngah-molkkun-do-niyan bo maybe lsg.Assert-unknown-die-FUT PARTICLE
   ‘I might die sometime without anyone [e.g. my family] knowing about it.’ (Evans, 2006: 95)
b. arlenge-nge aherre-kathene ayenge itirre-ke, arleye-rle!
far-ABL kangaroo-KATHENE 1.sgS think-pc, emu-TOP
‘Hey! From afar I thought it was a kangaroo, but it turns out that it’s an emu’ (Wilkins, 1986: 589)

Note that in the examples in (10), the referential entities represented by the P values are not distinct, viz. they do not identify different physical persons (in 10b) or may not even index identifiable entities (in 10a): although other examples below will demonstrate that the P’s in (9) can signal two separate persons, it is important to recognise that they stand for value types, not simple acts of reference, and can therefore have a range of referential interpretations. What is fundamental, is that the two ‘persons’ receive a distinct deictic interpretation: one corresponds to the speaker at the time of the utterance, another is a represented participant that stands in a deictic relation to the speaker, a meaning Jakobson (1957) represents with the forward slash ‘/’, as in (11).7

(11) P / P

Obviously, the multiple-perspective interpretation in (10) can only arise in the context of some at-issue meaning, semantic content with respect to which perspectives are expressed, which Jakobson (1957) calls a narrated event, E^n.8 With these semantic building blocks in place, we can explicitly state the main semantic components of the examples in (10), as in (12).

(12) a. E^n P^n_x / P^1_x ( = 10a)
b. E^n P^1_1 / P^1_1 ( = 10b)

As previously, the superscripts ‘n’ and ‘s’ stand for ‘narrated’ and ‘speech’, respectively. The representation in (12a) signals that for the at-issue meaning ‘I will (maybe) be dead’ (E^n) there is a non-specific narrated participant (P^n_x) who has no knowledge of the E^n and a speaker (P^1_x), who presently assumes the future possibility that the E^n will occur. The contribution of the superscripts in the representation can be seen particularly fruitfully in (12b). Although the first person reference in (12b) refers to the speaker in both instances, ‘P^1_1’ involves a represented, narrated participant, ‘P^n_1’ the first person current speech participant, and the structure signals a perspective of both on the E^n ‘it is a kangaroo’.

The representation in (12) leads to two observations: first, the basic semantic representation of multiple perspective, as in (12), is fully identical to that of mood. This does not necessarily indicate that multiple-perspective meanings and mood are always expressed with the same specific set of grammatical means, but that, at a general level, the same participant structure

7 The definition of multiple perspective constructions currently allows for flexibility in two directions: (1) Evans (2006: 99) allows for the (hypothetical) possibility that they can express more than two different perspectives and (2) San Roque (2008; 2010) suggests that the second P in (11) needs not always correspond to the current speaker (but in some languages and constructions may also, e.g., index the addressee). While examples of these two suggested phenomena are, so far, exceedingly rare in the literature, it would be unproblematic to expand the basic structure in (11) to include more ‘persons’, or other discourse participants at the moment of speech.

8 In this paper I will consider the type of multi-perspective construction that Evans (2006: 99) classifies as ‘epistemic modality’, and it is unambiguously clear that these require an at-issue meaning. For the two other types of multiple-perspective constructions Evans (2006) exemplifies, ‘interpersonal social relationship’ and ‘absolute/relative tense’ it could perhaps be possible to model these without a component E^n, but this is a suggestion I will not explore here.
underlies both meanings. For ease of reference I will call any meaning that hinges on all (and only) the elements in (12) a ‘modal meaning’. According to Evans (2006: 99), ‘multiple-perspective constructions are constructions that encode potentially distinct values, on a single semantic dimension, that reflect two or more distinct perspectives or points of reference’. Given the representation in (12), we may conclude that this single dimension for (10) is a modal one, and Evans (2006) indeed classifies constructions as in as ‘epistemic modality’.

There is, however, a crucial difference between the multiple-perspective meaning in (10a) and the one in (10b). As shown in (12), both involve a modal participant structure, and for (10a) the representation in (12a) is enough to account for all meaning elements. Example (10b), however, contains an additional meaning: apart from the perspective of a $P_n^1$ and a $P_s^1$, and an $E^n$ it states that the $E^n$ represents a belief that the $P_n^1$ actually held at some point in time and that $P_s^1$ does not hold. Unlike in (10a), in which the act of ‘not knowing’ by $P_n^1$ is only interpreted as part of the current speech event, the mistaken belief expression in (10b) requires that the belief ‘it is a kangaroo’ is interpreted as part of two events: one prior to and one encompassing the current speech event. Returning to the simplified version of the participant structure in (11), we may represent this as in (13).

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
E & E \\
\hline
P & P
\end{array}
\]

The representation in (13) suggests that a multiple-perspective construction of the type as in (10b) combines at least two event variables, two person variables and a deictic relation between each. The vertical lines in (13) indicate that the specific meaning of the multiple-perspective construction arises in interaction between the two parallel structures, rather than as a function of each structure individually. Every person value in the second line in (13) interacts with the event it aligns with. Since, as per section 2.1, each event is an abstraction over participants, the person values in the second line are not simply contextualised within the event structure in the first line in (13), but interact with person values already implicit in the event structure. Whereas the participant structure at the bottom line in (13) builds a modal meaning, the top line builds an evidential one. As a multiple-perspective construction, examples such as (10b) involve an (epistemic) modal component, and an evidential meaning. The claim I will defend here is that characterising the interaction between the event structure of the modal meaning and the implicit event structure of the evidential meaning accounts for the specific interpretation of the multiple-perspective construction in (10b).

Consider the more elaborated semantic representation of (10b) in (14):

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
E^n & P_{E^n}^1 & P_{E^n}^a \\
\hline
P_n^1 & / & P_s^1
\end{array}
\]

Although the gloss ‘think’ in (10b) may obscure the similarity with constructions as in (4a), the first line in (14) explicates a similar evidential meaning (cf. 5). The at-issue meaning $E^n$ (i.e. ‘it is a kangaroo’) forms an evidential structure with $P_{E^n}^1$ to represent the meaning ‘I said/thought it was a kangaroo’ (i.e. the $P_{E^n}^1$ indicated by the first singular pronoun perceived the $E^n$ ‘it is a kangaroo’ as part of a narrative speech event $E^n$) and the $P_{E^n}^a$ presents this

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Since this meaning is exactly the same for both the bottom modal structure and the top evidential structure in (14) it is shown only once as an element shared by both levels.

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meaning in the current speech event.\textsuperscript{10} Although referentially, all person values index the same first person subject, the way in which it is interpreted for each of the values in (14) is distinct: in $P^n_sE^m$ the first person is involved in the narrated ‘speech’ event as the entity perceiving\textsuperscript{11} the $E^n$. In $P^n_sE^n$ the first person referent is the entity reporting the $E^n$ in the current speech event. In $P^n_nE^n$ the first person referent evaluates the $E^n$ as something true and in $P^n_s$ as something false. The complex interaction between these four variables determines the multiple-perspective meaning in (10b). The semantic representation of (10b) as a combination of an evidential and a modal meaning is not unique to multiple-perspective constructions. In fact, as (10a) showed, the evidential meaning is not required to arrive at a multiple-perspective interpretation. The combination is typical, however, of reported speech constructions (Buchstaller, 2011: 63–64; Buchstaller, 2014; Spronck, 2012). Consider a typical opposition between direct and indirect speech constructions in English, as in (15).

\begin{itemize}
  \item (15) a. John said: “I will read a book”
  \item b. John said that he would read a book
\end{itemize}

There is widespread consensus about the meaning of the opposition in (15): with a direct speech construction as in (15a) the speaker indicates that s/he represents the reported message ($E^n$) as allegedly uttered in the narrated speech event ($E^m$), whereas with indirect speech as in (15b), the speaker adopts the perspective of the current speech event ($E^n$) (cf. Wierzbicka, 1974; Evans, 2012). As the meaning components shown above indicate, both (15a) and (15b) express evidential meanings, but there are subtle differences between them: a direct speech construction may indicate that the speaker gives a reliable representation of the narrative speech event $E^m$, whereas with an indirect speech construction the $E^n$ is formulated in the current speech event $E^n$, which shows greater cognitive distance from $E^m$. As Cornillie (2009) points out: “some reports are considered reliable whereas others are not” and “degrees of reliability are often associated with modes of knowing or evidential types” (Cornillie, 2009: 58). Buchstaller (2011: 64) directly links this to the function of reported speech constructions: ‘the evidential meaning marks the access of the reporting speaker to the reported material’ (also cf. Spronck, 2012).\textsuperscript{12}

Apart from an indication of to what extent the $E^n$ is presented as in the $E^m$, reported speech constructions often also signal to what extent the current speaker evaluates the $E^n$ as a true statement. This is a modal meaning, represented by the lower participant structure in (14). Note that, because the $P^n$ and $P^s$ have different values in a mistaken belief construction, the

\textsuperscript{10}The distinction between reported speech and reported thought in this evidential meaning can be ignored: if a belief expressed as a full narrative event is attributed to a non-first person subject, the implication is that it was uttered. The semantic representation reflects the conventional meaning of a reported speech or thought construction: wether the represented thought/utterance was actually uttered (verbatim) in the real world is irrelevant to the semantics of reported speech or thought.

\textsuperscript{11}With the first person cognisant in (10b), the producer and the perceiver are obviously the same referential entity, but, as shown in section 2.1, the evidential meaning is constructed by the receptive nature of the evidential event.

\textsuperscript{12}Although most studies on (morphological) evidentiality focus on a single type of ‘reportative’/‘quotative’ or single opposition ‘reportative’/‘quotative’, there is evidence that the subtle meaning distinctions expressed by multi-word reported speech constructions as in (15) can become equally, or more, complex in languages with morphological evidentiality (Spronck, 2012: 101–103). The ‘degrees of knowledge'/‘access’ evidential account explains why many languages have a variety of reported speech constructions, even though each of these express the generalised evidential meaning represented in (5) at some level, and why the reported speech meaning is the most common type of morphological evidential attested in evidential systems (Aikhenvald, 2015).
opposition between $P^a$ and $P^e$ gains full semantic recognition: if both the current speaker and the reported speaker do not challenge the truth of a reported message $E^n$, the modal meaning can remain unexpressed. A mistaken belief construction merely brings out the participant structure that is inherent in the interpretation of reported speech.

Before illustrating this point further, it is worthwhile to examine the most explicit expression of the modal/evidential participant structure in multiple-perspective constructions in slightly more detail. Examples from two more Australian languages are shown in (16).

(16) a. *ni-injama-yn, wu-lhal-mandhaayung anubani*

> 3MSG-think-PP COLL-country-Mandhaayung that.NEUT.TOP.ANAPH

*nigawi-wuqij ana-lhaal*

> 3MSG-only NEUT-country

‘He thought he was still in his own Mandhaayung moiety country (when he was not)’ (Heath 1980: 150-151; cited in Horrack, 2014: 216)

b. *Talking about birds who mistake little stones for food:*

> [[ birt-niyangarri=karra ] burr-ma-ø [ mangarri ] rarrki kanda mara

[[ 3pl-good=MAYBE ] 3pl-do-PRS [ food ] ] stone m.PROX see

*wurr-yi-ø-ngarri*

> 3nw.O:3pl.S-BE-PRS-SUB

‘When they see these stones, they think they are good food [but they are not]’

(100903-18NGUN, 3:10-3:12)

Leaving out the distinction in number for simplicity, the Wubuy example in (16a) and the Ungarinyin example in (16b) both have a participant structure that may be represented as in (17).

(17) $E^n$ | $P^e$

$P^3_{En}$ | $P^3_{Es}$

$P^3_{En}$ | $P^3_{Es}$

Unlike in (17b), the participant structures reflected in (16) involve distinct referential entities, but as (17) shows, the evidential and modal participant structures parallel each other: a third person referent in the $P^e_{En}$ is paired with a third person referent in $P^n$ and the first person speaker reporting the $E^n$ as $P^e$ corresponds to a first person $P^e$ evaluating the $E^n$ as false. The parallelism between participant structures is a defining feature of (evidential) multiple-perspective constructions: there is no requirement for person values to have the same referential value, but they have to be coordinated. In both (16a) and (16b) this coordination is expressed by a striking interaction between the ‘reporting clause’, i.e. the verbal expression of the $P^e_{En}$, and the clause expressing the ‘mistaken belief’ $E^n$. Wubuy uses a clause-initial, atypical reporting verb in combination with a non-verbal clause (Horrack, 2014: 216), Ungarinyin (in which reporting clauses are typically clause-final) the clause expressing the mistaken belief is discontinuous and interrupted by the reporting clause (Spronck, 2015).

To what extent the presence of the reporting clause is required in order to (diachronically) develop an evidential multiple-perspective meaning is an empirical question requiring further typological examination. Nyunynyl appears to be a language in which the ‘mistaken belief’ particle *ilbi* may combine with a matrix clause as in (18a), but may also occur without one.
(18b). As the Kayardild example in (1a) showed, however, an evidential multiple-perspective meaning may be expressed without a reporting clause.¹³

(18) a. min-djed wol-oŋ djo-elbe
    mi-ny-jid wul-ung juy-ilbi
    2MIN.NOM-PST-go water-ALL1 2MIN.CRD-MB

    yan-dje
    nga-n-d-jiŋ
    1MIN.NOM-CM-say-2MIN.OBL

    “I thought you went for water, but you did not” (Nekes and Worms, 1953, cited in McGregor, 2011: 383)

b. yai-elbe yan-djed wol-oŋ, are yale-djedian
    ngay-ilbi nga-ny-jid wul-ung arri nga-li-jid-an
    1MIN.CRD-MB 1MIN.NOM-PST-go water-ALL1 not 1MIN.NOM-IRR-go-IMP

    “You thought I went for water, but I did not” (Nekes and Worms, 1953, cited in McGregor, 2011: 383)

Discussing the examples in (18) from Nekes and Worms (1953), McGregor (2011: 383) writes:

> According to [the] analysis [of Nekes and Worms (1953),] examples such as [(18b)] are elliptical versions of complex sentences with framing clauses. This analysis, it seems to me, puts the cart before the horse: it seems implausible to treat the full complement construction as the genuine grammatical construction [...].

The Jakobsonian representation of mistaken belief constructions adds credibility to the claim in Nekes and Worms (1953), since the reporting clause plays an important role in coordinating the perspectives expressed the construction in (18a). However, the observation that the participant structures of the modal and evidential component of multiple-perspective constructions necessarily both refer to the same entity, also motivates a diachronic development in which the complex meaning arising from the interaction of these elements becomes expressed with one single particle, as in (1a).

In summary, not all multiple-perspective constructions require a paired modal-evidential structure, but for the ones that do the participants in the evidential meaning and in the modal meaning are aligned. Maximally simplified this pattern could be summarised as in (19).

(19) \[ \begin{array}{c|c} E & \ \ / & \ \ / \\ \hline P & P \end{array} \]

¹³The semantic explication of (18a) is the same as in (14), that of (18b) as in (18'), and that of (1a) as in (17).

(18') \[ \begin{array}{c} E^a \\ \hline P^a_2 \ / & \ / \ \ / \\ P^a_1 \end{array} \]

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3.2 Non-commitment in ‘evidential implicature’

‘Modal effects’ of enhancing or decreasing the commitment to some at-issue meaning, arising from the form of reporting constructions have been widely documented: a first type is represented by, what Vandelanotte (2006) calls, ‘distancing reported speech’, two examples of which are shown in (20).

(20) a. We have, I think, learned at least some of the lessons, though we have not yet finished clearing up the moral squalor (Vandelanotte, 2006: 145)
    b. John will be late, he said (Vandelanotte, 2006: 151)

What (20a, b) have in common, is that they display a strong connection between $P^{En}$ and $P^{Es}$: in (20a), the reported thought is formulated by the speaker from her/his perspective. The same is true for the reported speech in (20b): although the speech report ($E^n$) is not attributed to the speaker,

both component clauses are speech acts of the current speaker, which means that it is this current speaker who is committed to the assertion that John will be late. That is to say, the speaker both claims that John will be late, and that John said something to that effect (which makes him or her believe that he will indeed be late) (Vandelanotte, 2006: 151)

Vandelanotte (2006) characterises this construction type as strongly subjectivised.

The situation is quite the reverse for expressions of the type as in (1b), i.e. instances in which it is stressed that the current speaker ($P^{Es}$) is maximally distinct from the reported speaker ($P^{En}$). The implicature based on these features can be described as: if, high commitment is implied, if they are distinct low commitment is implied. I.e., aspects of the evidential meaning appear to imply a certain modal interpretation (cf. Kockelman 2004).

If we take seriously the suggestion that reported speech/thought constructions combine a modal and an evidential meaning, we may represent (20a) using the paired structure in (21).

Since the modal values are not specified in this construction, in (21) they are not indexed, but the variables are nonetheless available.

(21) $E^n$ $P^{En}$ $P^{Es}$ $P^n$ $P^s$

The generalised pattern suggested by the ‘modal effects’ of the evidential meaning is proposed in (22): the degree of similarity between $P^{En}$ and $P^{Es}$ suggests an evaluation of the truth of the $E^n$ by the $P^s.$

14Although person features (e.g. first vs. third person) play an important role in distinguishing between $P^{En}$ and $P^{Es},$ example (20b) demonstrates that other indexical features, such as tense, play a role in indicating the similarity between the Ens and Es as well.

15I believe that the proposed paired structure can also accommodate the main argument Kockelman (2004) presents for his notion of a ‘commitment event’: ‘The common view that epistemic modality depends on the “speaker’s commitment to what she is saying” misconstrues the locus of commitment insofar as it takes speaker to be a primitive role, rather than the bundling together of a set of more basic, analytically distinguishable roles’. Within the paired modal/evidential structure such roles may be easily assigned, even in the way Kockelman (2004) proposes: a speech-producing entity (animator), an utterance designing entity (author) and a truth-committing entity (principal), following Goffman (1974). For Kockelman (2004), the
The paired structure and the effect suggested in (22) explicate the description in Cornillie (2009: 57) that evidential and modal epistemic meanings ‘can qualify the same clause [but] they do different things. Evidential expressions indicate that there are reasons for the assumption made by the speaker and epistemic expressions evaluate that assumption.’ The paired version of the Jakobsonian calculus of modal and evidential meanings allows us to examine the dynamics of these categories, even when they are not explicitly specified in the linguistic structure.

3.3 Expressing evidentiality with modal elements

The paired modal-evidential structure can also be applied to implicatures arising between assumed modal meanings and evidential interpretations. This type of implicature arises in several ways. First of all, modal evaluations simply appear to be more frequent in reported speech constructions than elsewhere. An indication of this observation is shown in Table 1, based on an approximately 3000-word Ungarinyin text. The table compares the frequencies of mood types for sentences that are not attributed to anyone other than the speaker (i.e. have no evidential interpretation) and those that do. In the latter category, a distinction is made between sentences without a reporting clause (‘P^{En} not marked’), reported message clauses accompanied by a reporting clause (‘P^{En} marked’) and the reporting clause itself (‘P^{En} clause’). Apart from mood, Table 1 also shows the distributions for interjections (‘inter’) and evaluative lexemes, which I consider to express modal meanings as well. But the mood column suffices to illustrate the point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVAL</th>
<th>INTER</th>
<th>MOOD</th>
<th>TOTAL VALUES/CLAUSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>non-attributed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P^{En} not marked</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P^{En} marked</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P^{En} clause</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Modal meanings in (Coate, 1966)

The occurrence of modal values relative to their general frequency in sentence types, is high, even in clauses in which the reporting clause is absent. The association between the occurrence of evidential and modal meanings means that the evidential interpretation can be suggested by the presence of a modal meaning already.

commitment event coincides with the event in which the principal is established and in the paired structure that could simply be the P^e. The ‘author’ role can be understood as the relation between P^{E_n} and P^{E^s} (if they coincide, as in Vandelanotte’s (2006) distancing indirect speech) the speaker assumes an author role. The P^{E^s} can be understood as the participant simply voicing the speech/thought report, i.e. the ‘animator’.

With these interpretations the formula proposed here can account for all phenomena Kockelman (2004) describes (and, in addition, can make a further distinction between constructions that do and do not involve the paired structure). However, I am persuaded by the arguments in Irvine (1996) against using the Goffmanian speaker roles, or any further sub-division thereof into more specific speaker roles, for grammatical description, and will not explore these suggestions here further.
A concrete example of an Ungarinyin modal meaning in reported speech is shown in (23). Here, a modal element is embedded in the reported speech clause (i.e. evaluates $E^n$), representing the perspective of the $P^n_3$.

(23) A travel party sees smoke in the distance and speculates about whether some fellow travellers who have travelled ahead (‘they’) have caught up with the fire (‘it’) already:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{bejakarra} \quad \text{norl} \quad \text{wudmanga} \quad \text{budmerndu} \\
&\text{beja=karra} \quad \text{norl} \quad \text{wurr-ma-nga} \quad \text{burr-ma-o-rndu} \\
\text{CMPLV=_MAYBE \ get.close \ 3nO:O:3pl.S-take-PST \ 3pl.S-do-PRS-3pl.IO}
\end{align*}
\]

‘They say about them: “They may have already caught up with it” ’ (111015-02PNNKDDJEUD, 11:38-11:40)

The specific meaning of (23) could be rendered as in (24).

(24) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
E^n \quad P^n_3 \\
/ \\
E \quad P
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

I suggest that the most relevant variables in this formula are the ones highlighted in (25):

(25) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
E \\
P
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

Significantly, the observation that the modal value is attributed to someone other than the current speaker and connected to a $E^n_\text{ns}$ leads to the automatic conclusion about the interpretation of the $P^E$: it is part of an evidential meaning (also cf. Haßler, 2002). This is another demonstration of how multiple-perspective constructions merely make explicit a pattern that is fundamental to reported speech constructions more generally.

The distributions in Table 1 indicate that modal meanings can be used to predict the likelihood of a sentence to be attributed to someone other than the speaker (i.e. have an evidential meaning) in constructions which are not marked as reported speech constructions. But modal meanings cannot be the only factor here, so I will leave this topic for a separate discussion.

Finally, I would briefly like to return to the case of evidential must in (1c), because it demonstrates perhaps the most interesting connection between modal and evidential interpretations. More particularly, I would like to propose that it shows a pattern that is the mirror image of the one in (22): the degree of integration between the $P^n$ and $P^s$ suggest properties of the $P^{E\text{ns}}$ value.

(26) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
P^n_3 \\
P^n \\
/ \\
P^{E} \\
P^{E\text{ns}} \\
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

I will not take a position with respect to the core meaning of must, but note that the modal interpretation has a direct influence on how evidential must is interpreted: in the sentence ‘It must be a good book’, if the assessment ‘it is a good book’ is epistemically qualified by the same $P^n$ and $P^s$ values (i.e. the speaker), the resulting interpretation of must is inferential. If
these values are different, i.e. when $P^m$ is not the current speaker, the resulting meaning is one of reported speech.

The constructed, and admittedly slightly contrived, Dutch examples in (27) serve to illustrate this point.

(27) a. Dat moet een onbetwistbaar goed boek zijn  
   ‘That must be an uncontestably good book’

   b. Een boek dat al drie maanden bovenaan de bestsellerlijsten staat? dat moet een goed boek zijn, vind ik 
   ‘[A book that has been topping the bestseller lists for three months] must be a good book, I find’

In (27a), the modifier onbetwistbaar ‘uncontestably’ signal that at some level of the semantic interpretation the at-issue meaning is not epistemically qualified, since the evaluation ‘possibly uncontestably’ contains an apparent clash in epistemic certainty. A natural interpretation of this clash is that there is a $P^m$ who makes the unqualified statement ‘it is a good book’ and a $P^s$ who relays this assessment as a speech report and adds an epistemic evaluation. Example (27b) aims to demonstrate that when the assessment ‘(possibly) a good book’ indexes the speaker both as the $P^m$ and the $P^s$, the resulting interpretation of $P^E^m$ is that this qualification is what the speaker infers.

4 Pragmatic effects in the semantic structure: Evidentiality and positioning

The parallel participant structure in multiple-perspective meanings is a rather specific type of interaction between a modal and an evidential meaning, but the discussion in 3.2 and 3.3 has shown that it can be consistently applied to a range of phenomena related to reported speech. By explicating the contribution of the participant variables involved in modal and evidential meanings, the paired structure can contribute to characterising the pragmatic and semantic interactions within the domain of ‘stance’.

Du Bois (2007) defines stance as consisting of three complementary meanings: evaluating, positioning and aligning. Evaluating is ‘the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value’ (Du Bois, 2007: 143), positioning is ‘the act of situating a social actor with respect to responsibility for stance and for invoking sociocultural value’ (Du Bois, 2007: 143) and aligning is ‘the act of calibrating the relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers’ (Du Bois, 2007: 144). Du Bois (2007) stresses that these are deeply interconnected concepts. I consider the modal and evidential effects in reported speech a direct consequence of this interconnectedness: the reported speech construction as a whole builds a complex stance meaning, in which highlighting evaluative (i.e. modal) meaning affects ‘positioning’ interpretations. Explicitly stating a position with respect to the reported message through an evidential meaning influences the evaluative interpretation.

The paired participant structure consisting of a modal and an evidential component suggested above allows us to chart the constant interaction between represented and indexical participants contributing to stance, both in the current speech event and between narrated events and current speech events. The paired participant structure offers a way of discussing how these interactions are grammatically relevant.
The paired model can also help to explain diachronic developments in reported speech construction, extending to other types of (inter)subjective constructions: once the participant structure has been established, participants may be highlighted or erode in certain constructions (diachronically) deriving from reported speech constructions, or receive different types of values (see Spronck forthc.).

In conclusion, in this paper I have built on Jakobson (1957) in order to argue that reported speech and stance constructions consist of a double participant structure that causes specific semantic effects. I have proposed that by systematically exploring the formalisation of verbal categories first laid out in Jakobson (1957), we may develop a fuller account of stance and demonstrate that common pragmatic effects in reported speech constructions can be related to a common semantic structure. I expect that by exploring the typological patterns that emerge in the expression of the parallel participant structure further it will reveal the full substance of Jakobson’s (1957) fundamental insight that modal and evidential meanings crucially involve person values.

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