Minds divided: Speaker attitudes in quotatives

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes how speakers can co-encode a reported message and an evaluation of that message in a quotative construction. It presents a typological account of the structures and meanings languages may employ to express, for example, (dis)agreement with or doubt in the truth of the message conveyed and suggests ways in which this may correlate with types of quotative constructions. It argues that interactions between modality and evidentiality in quotatives determine their form and function, and introduces a constructionist model to capture these interactions. By identifying the categories relevant for studying speaker attitudes in quotation, it aims to present a method for the typological analysis of quotatives as ‘double-voiced utterances’, as conceived in Vološinov (1973) and Jakobson (1957).

Keywords: Quotative constructions, speaker attitudes, modality, evidentiality, multiple-perspective constructions, double-voiced utterances
1 Introduction

The ubiquitous preoccupation with truthfulness in the philosophy of language is but one expression of the inability of (Western) language users to separate ascription in utterances from the attitude of the speaker towards the extra-linguistic world. Grice’s (1989) maxims presuppose a default commitment to the truth of an utterance and speaking implies asserting characteristics about the relationship of the speaker towards the extra-linguistic world. For at least one construction type, quotative constructions, this is too limited a view. Quotative constructions, conveying a proposition that does not originate with the current speaker, are specialized in conveying information the speaker is not quite certain about, that she might not believe at all or about which she is merely hypothesizing, as, canonically, the only evidence for the proposition comes from the discourse of another speaker. In this chapter I will argue that the speaker attitude in quotation does not signal a direct relation between the current speaker and the extra-linguistic

1 For discussion and comments on examples I am indebted to Zygmunt Frajzyngier (Lele), Anna Gladkova (Russian), Frank Lichtenberk (Toqabaqita), Martin Haspelmath (Russian), Lila San Roque, Chikako Senge (Japanese), Hein van der Voort, Anna Wierzbicka, Masa Yamaguchi (Japanese) and especially Nick Evans and Alan Rumsey. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Radboud University, the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands and the Australian National University, Kioloa/Canberra. I also thank these audiences for comments, especially Joshua Birchall (Wari’), Nick Enfield, Ad Foolen, Steve Levinson and, again, Hein van der Voort. Alan Rumsey and Lila San Roque read through the pre-final version of this chapter and provided invaluable comments, for which I am very grateful. Finally, I would very much like to thank the editors of the present volume and three anonymous reviewers for comments which helped to improve this chapter considerably. The usual disclaimers apply.
world but between the current speaker and a discourse element (Jakobson 1957; “speech about speech” Vološinov 1973:155), which inherently adds an extra layer of subjectivity to quoted utterances. Furthermore, I will argue that although the degree to which this subjectivity is explicitly encoded varies considerably in specific constructions and languages, it constitutes an inalienable ingredient of every report. I will further present a typological account of how it plays a central role in the grammaticalization of quotatives.

A few preliminaries need to be addressed. In the present chapter I understand quotatives as *multiple-perspective constructions* (Evans 2009), that is, constructions combining the perspectives of (at least) two speakers. These constructions minimally include the perspective of the current speaker (\(S_{\text{current}}\)) and the reported speaker (\(S_{\text{reported}}\)) and some proposition \(p\). However, the relationship (as symbolized by the arrows) between the current speaker and a proposition in quotatives should not be interpreted as in figure 1, but more as in figure 2.

![Figure 1](image1.png)  
**Figure 1** Two speakers talking about the same proposition

![Figure 2](image2.png)  
**Figure 2** The relation between a reporting speaker and the proposition in a quotative construction
In words: quotatives do not convey a relation between the current speaker and some world or proposition, but between the current speaker and a discourse situation (cf. McGregor 1994), which consists of a discourse entity (the $S_{\text{reported}}$) and a proposition $p$. A speaker attitude in a quotative, then, is a characterization of the current speaker of the relationship between the reported speaker and some proposition (this definition will be refined later on in this chapter.

The ways in which a speaker may express an evaluation about the discourse of another speaker are potentially unrestricted: compare (1a,b,c).

(1a) You what? Won the Nobel peace prize?! 
(1b) John said to Mary: [funny voice] “I never even came close to that vase” 
(1c) John maintained that he had told the truth

If (1a) is uttered as a response to the statement “I won the Nobel peace prize”, it may indicate a strong disbelief or surprise about the message. In the context of a broken vase lying on the floor, the addressee may infer from (1b) that the speaker doubts the authenticity of John’s story. Similarly, prosodic stress on the lexeme MAINTAIN in (1c), may imply that the current speaker is hesitant to vouch for the truth of the reported message. It remains to be demonstrated to what extent these meanings are part of the conventionalized meanings of the English constructions (1a,b,c), but their
apparent context dependency suggests that they are part of a pragmatic process rather than structurally encoded (also see footnote 9).

Unlike English, some languages allow the current speaker to express an evaluation of the reported message structurally and thus semantically, for example, through modal particles. One example of such a construction is the Lele (Chadic) (2), in which the current speaker indicates that she does not vouch for the truth of the reported message, as signaled by the dubative marker sáŋ.

(2) cànígé ná-y no go lele sáŋ

C. CMPL-3m COP REF Lele DUB

‘Canige said that he is a Lele man, but I have my doubts’

(Frajzyngier 2001: 174)

As I will defend in section 3, I assume that reports may be encoded in a variety of quotative constructions, ranging from periphrastic to morphological strategies, which may be distinguished on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic grounds. Without committing to a single grammatical theory, a version of construction grammar will be adopted throughout in which particular meanings arise from a specific combination of linguistic elements in the utterance, rather than individual structures (Croft 2001; Goldberg 1995, 2006; also see Vandelanotte, this volume). The relevance of this analysis will be demonstrated in section 5.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in section 2 I will further introduce the problems involved in studying speaker attitudes in quotatives, discuss a number of methodological preliminaries and define quotative constructions. Section 3 will identify the grammatical categories ‘modality’ and ‘evidentiality’ as central ingredients of quotative constructions. Section 4 will present a typological sample study of the relevant grammatical strategies 25 unrelated languages may employ to encode speaker attitudes in quotatives based on their description in a sample of descriptive grammars. Section 5 presents a framework for analyzing quotative constructions and section 6 will form a brief conclusion.

2 Speaker attitudes and quotative constructions

Structures that explicitly encode speaker judgments about the world or discourse are common in the world’s languages. Compare the clitic =sɔn in Semelai (Mon-Khmer, Aslian) that expresses ‘the deduction or drawing to a conclusion in terms of the narrator’s or speaker’s belief or opinion’ (Kruspe 2004: 414; cf. example 3).

(3) kmɔŋ critɔ=son

finish story=SC

‘(Evidently) the story is finished’ (Kruspe 2004: 416)
In (3) the marker =sɔn indicates that it is the speaker who makes the assessment about the proposition ‘the story is finished’. When used in a quotative construction as in (4), however (which is signalled in Semelai by the particle $k^h\text{laŋ}^2$), the evaluation signaled by sɔn is attributed to the reported speaker, not the speaker uttering (4).

(4) “knkɔn claka?=sɔn” $k^h\text{laŋ}$

child ill-omened=SC QUOT

“‘Evidently, an ill-omened child’, (they) concluded’ (ibid.: 416)

In (4), the speakers, ‘they’, to whom the reported message ‘an ill-omened child’ is to be attributed, are responsible for the speaker evaluation marker sɔn. We may call this change in responsibility a shift in the ‘origo of evaluation’. A similar shift occurs between the English (5a) and (5b). In the Koasati (Muskogean, Eastern) example (6), the realis and inferential are ‘framed’ from the perspective of the reported speaker, the source of the message.

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2 Although the quotative particle may often suffice to signal a report (Krupse 2004: 405), a reported speaker may also be indicated in the source construction (cf. 4’):

(4’) “ah k^hɔn crɛh l^h\text{ay}=ca?!” $k^h\text{laŋ}$ smaʔ rabon
ah get fish be.big=EM QUOTE person
be.short.sighted

“Ah, I’ve got a big fish!” exclaimed the short-sighted man (Krupse 2004: 403)
(5a) It may have rained yesterday [i.e., but I, speaker, don’t know for sure]

(5b) John said that it may have rained yesterday [i.e., but John doesn’t know for sure]

(6) wáykat
    nakáltoko:limpak
    wáyka-t
    nakálla-toho:-li-mpa-k
    fly.sg-connector
    go.off:sg-realis-inferential-hearsay-past
    copoklinitkák
    copoklinitká-k
    hummingbird-subject

    ‘Hummingbird (must have) flown off, (so it is said)’ (Kimball 1991: 205)

Although shifts in origo in evaluation, which mean shifts in the discourse participant to whom the evaluative component of the quotative construction is attributed, are found in quotative constructions cross-linguistically, they need not always occur. A case in point is the analysis of a Zapotec Mayan story in Sicoli (2007). In the story a daughter asks her mother for a present which the mother is unable to give her, as the narrator recalls with deep regret, knowing that the daughter will die of an illness later in the story. In (7), the speaker relays the mother’s words in a low-pitched breathy voice.
(7) nīi ndżò nóo nearkji? ndżò nóo
say 3f COMP ADJ-heart 3f COMP

tʃēy yoo bèe Santos Reyyes regallo? ndżò
POT bring pl saints kings gift +POS2 3f
She said that she wanted that the wise men bring her her gift (Sicoli 2007: 183-184)

By uttering the report in this way, “[t]he narrator’s evaluation of urgency leaks into the reported content and foreshadows the coming death of the child” (Sicoli, 2007: 185). The voice quality with which the report is uttered reflects a speaker attitude of the current speaker towards the reported message.

Arguably, a similar analysis could be made for English. Consider the case in which all discourse participants in discourse situation t₀ (i.e., the speech moment) knew John had been in a serious car accident and a speaker would utter (8) shaking her head and pulling a sad face.

(8) Yesterday John said that he was so happy to finally have his driver’s license

From the content of (8) it becomes clear that John would not be uttering his statement sadly, and the extra-linguistic cues of sadness and disbelief (in the
English case) would have to be interpreted as a comment by the current speaker on the message she is reporting.

An even more explicit example in which the current speaker is the origo of evaluation with respect to a proposition that is part of the quotative construction is shown in the Lele example (2) above. The evidence for the current speaker’s evaluation is not found in the acoustic speech signal but in the morphology of the language. The structural encoding of this current speaker evaluation enables us to specify its semantics in more detail than the less structurally identifiable emotional meanings in (7) and (8). The possibility to interpret (7) and (8) as indicated above could be seen as a prerequisite for speaker evaluations in quotatives to grammaticalize (cf. Hopper and Traugott 1993) but could be discarded as an anomaly of performance within a non-usage-based approach to language. The morphological expression of current (as opposed to reported) speaker evaluative meanings – as in (2), and other examples below which I will focus on – calls for a grammatical analysis of current speaker attitudes towards embedded quotative propositions in any syntactic theory. The central questions I aim to address in the present chapter are as follows: What

3 The exact syntactic status of (2) is not entirely clear; further research is required to show whether the dubitative marker sátŋ is actually part of the same clause as the quotative construction or whether it is in apposition with it. It could be argued that in (2) the modal particle is not part of the quotative clause, but, for example, anaphorically refers to it (an analysis that seems even more likely for the Nyulnyul example (21) below). Indeed Zygmunt Frajzyngier observes that the construction “very much had the afterthought air to it” (p.c., e-mail 7-9-2009). Even if we were to analyze (2) as two separate constructions (e.g., a quotative construction and a sátŋ dubitative construction) it needs to be explained why and how some constructions specialize in conveying current speaker attitudes towards reported messages. As the Kwaza (12) and Kayardild (22) examples show, these constructions may just as well be integrated in a single clause.
are the current speaker-evaluative meanings found in a sample of the world’s languages? How are these meanings expressed and how should we model these constructions for typological research?

An initial problem that a grammatical analysis of current speaker-evaluative meanings faces is that quotative constructions do not represent a single syntactic type in the languages of the world, and even one single language generally employs a range of morphological strategies (such as complementation, apposition, adverbial strategies and inflectional strategies; see also section 4). As a first definition, however, I will assume that a characterization of quotative constructions should minimally include the semantic elements in (9a), with a preliminary representation as in (9b). The subscript ‘quotative construction’ indicates that the construction is formed by the combination of elements described in (9b) and subscript elements in the representations to follow will refer to either a structural or a semantic aspect of the respective construction.

(9a) NARRATING SOURCE and MESSAGE
(9b) [SOURCE construction MESSAGE construction]_{quotative construction}

The narrating source is some kind of discourse entity, which I refer to here as the reported speaker. The reported speaker is the speaker whose discourse the proposition in the reported message is attributed to by the current speaker and who is allegedly responsible for asserting the proposition made
in the reported message (whether this is historically accurate, i.e. whether the message was actually uttered or formulated in exactly this way is linguistically irrelevant). The speaker stating that the reported speaker is responsible for the reported message is the current speaker, the discourse participant who utters the quotative construction. The reported message is a proposition which is presented by the current speaker as belonging to the discourse of some other speaker (cf. McGregor 1994).

Given their structural diversity, the only significant way in which to define quotative constructions cross-linguistically is through their semantics (Collins 2001: 11). It should be uncontroversial that these semantics minimally include indicating that an utterance comes from a source other than the speaker at speech moment $t_0$ (even if that source is not made explicit, as in hearsay constructions) and a reported message. The representation in (9b) will be revised and expanded throughout this chapter, but for now it states that the unique combination of a construction encoding information about a narrating source and a construction encoding a reported utterance build a quotative construction. I will assume the source meaning, that is, the presence of a (implied) reported speaker and the reported message meaning to be central to quotative constructions. Constructions in which either of these meanings is absent are not quotative constructions under the definition in (9). Consider (10a), which – without any overt reference to whether the proposition is to be interpreted as a historical description, a reflection of the thoughts of anyone in particular, the speech
of anyone in particular or that of a group of people – could be interpreted as an instance of free indirect speech (Vološinov 1973). Only under some of these interpretations can the construction be understood as referring to a discourse element. This perceived ambiguity leads to the conclusion that (10a) does not explicitly encode the presence of a reported speaker and, thus, is not a quotative construction. Similarly, (10b) is quite clearly not a quotative construction because it only makes reference to a reported speaker, not a message. On the other hand, the Tariana (Arawakan, Northern Maipuran) example (11) is a quotative construction under the definition in (9a,b) because the marker pidaka (‘recent past reportative’) can only encode information that the speaker has heard from some narrative source, necessarily implying the presence of a reported speaker and thus co-encoding the meanings ‘source’ and ‘message’.

(10a) 2010 would see the ascension of the first Australian female prime-minister

(10b) John told me the story

(11) Ceci /ñinu-nuku du-kwisa-pidaka

C. dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3sgf-scold-REC.P.REP

‘Cecilia scolded the dog’ (Tariana; Aikhenvald 2003b: 133-134)

(more literally: They say/it is said Cecilia scolded the dog)
Beginning with Vološinov (1973) and Jakobson (1957) a research tradition has developed in which quotatives are treated as double-voiced utterances and ‘speech-within-speech’, expressing ‘a voice’ of the reported speaker through that of the current (reporting) speaker. The implications of this view have been most seriously explored in anthropological linguistics (cf. Besnier 1993; Sicoli 2007). However, many more semantically or discourse oriented accounts of quotatives have stressed that some quotative constructions indicate the view of the reported speaker, while others foreground that of the reporting speaker (cf. Coulmas 1986; von Roncador 1988; Wierzbicka 1974). Although traditional labels as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ speech seem to be simplifications of a bigger range of subtypes (Evans fc.) these studies converge upon the assumption that, with some quotative constructions, the current speaker indicates that the message (‘the voice of the reported speaker’) is more genuinely relayed than with other quotative constructions. (As pointed out in footnote 8, it need not necessarily be the case that the reported speaker actually uttered the original message as implied by the reporting speaker, just as it is not a grammatical problem if a speaker were to refer to a chair as thunder cloud.) Applying Wierzbicka’s notion of the ‘theatrical aspect’ of quotation, we could represent the distinction as the current speaker re-enacting a speech event, fully assuming the role of the

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4 The traditional opposition (cf. Coulmas 1986) invoked here in many studies is that of direct versus indirect speech (a and b respectively):
(a) John said: “I am not saying a word”
(b) John said he wouldn’t say a word
reported speaker, as opposed to *telling* about that event, maintaining her own perspective (cf. Evans, 2009; Wierzbicka 1974).

However, some languages allow their reporting speakers to show a wider display of acting skills than others. For a reasonably large number of languages it has been claimed that they only contain a single quotative construction (cf. Rumsey 1990 and references therein). The functions of the quotative construction in these languages may well cover a whole range of functions also found in languages that show more structural variety in the domain of quotation. Yet, they obviously do not contain any specialized forms that co-encode quotative and evaluative functions (as that would require more than one quotative construction). Languages like Lele and Zapotec Maya appear to more versatile in this respect, being able to *explicitly* express a current speaker attitude. The term current speaker-evaluative meaning in this chapter will refer to cases in which the current speaker expresses an evaluation of the proposition as expressed in the reported message construction of a quotative construction. In the next sections I aim to explore the extremes of the quotative theater and to demonstrate how the current speaker attitude contributes to shaping quotatives.

3  *Grammatical categories in quotative constructions*
Current speaker-evaluative meanings have received relatively little attention in grammatical descriptions and theoretical and typological literature (with a few notable exceptions, see section 4). However, the present chapter is informed by four well-established linguistic fields: speech act theory, the vast field of research on modality, the growing field of research on evidentiality, and cross-linguistic studies of reported speech, especially in the anthropological linguistic tradition. I will pair these analyses to the notion of multiple-perspective constructions (Evans 2009). This leads to the following questions: how can current speaker-evaluative meaning be encoded in quotative constructions? What is special about the pragmatics of quotative constructions with respect to evaluative meanings? What role do current speaker-evaluative meanings play in the grammaticalization of these constructions?

An important step to disentangling the perspectives of the reported speaker and the current (reporting) speaker is to separate the meanings of reporting a message and evaluating a message, two processes which are combined in quotative constructions (Jakobson 1957). The speaker-evaluative meaning belongs to the evaluating semantics of a quotative construction; in order for the message to be recognized, however, the speaker needs to make clear the message is to be attributed to the discourse of some other speaker, the reporting semantics of the quotative construction. Following Goffman (1979), a number of researchers have begun dissecting the speaker into an entity acting out several ‘speaker roles’ while
performing the speech act. Under such an analysis, these roles crucially differ per utterance. For example, in a quotative utterance U the speaker acts as an ‘Animator’ (the one uttering U) of the contents of U, and is the ‘Author’ (the one shaping U to fit the speech situation t₀) but is not the ‘Principal’ of U (the one responsible for its content) (cf. also Sicoli 2007: 176; Kockelman, 2004: 128). Although the concept of speaker roles provides a helpful tool in the analysis of discourse and the pragmatics of utterance types, it should be clear that it is a blunt knife when it comes to grammatical constructions. In the Lele example (2) the speaker is not merely relaying or animating the message and not only adjusting it to fit the current discourse situation t₀ by, for example, adjusting tense reference (cf. Vandelanotte, 2005); unlike in the English (7), she is also actively involved in shaping the meaning of the utterance as encoded by the quotative-with-dubitative construction. Lele is not the only language in which similar constructions are attested: compare the Kwaza (unclassified, Brazil) example (12) and the Japanese (isolate) example (13).

(12)  
\begin{verbatim}
aleçunwy-rydy-
\end{verbatim}  
\begin{verbatim}
hy-he-ki
\end{verbatim}  
\begin{verbatim}
tree-IRR-NOM-NEG-DEC
\end{verbatim}  
‘They said it is axe-handle wood but it isn’t’ (Van der Voort 2000: 308)
(13) kare wa kaeru ga toire ni iru to
    odokasi-ta
3msg TOP frog SUB toilet LOC be, stay COMPL
frighten, scare-PST

He scared me by saying that there were frogs in the toilet. (Chikako Senge p.c.)

In (12), the current speaker is, on the one hand, conveying a reported message stating that an object is made from a particular type of wood, while on the other, voicing the current speaker-evaluative meaning that this belief is false. With (13), the current speaker appears to convey a message she would not want to be(come) true. We could try to account for these current speaker attitudes towards the message by reviewing the role of ‘Principal’ and crediting it with some ability to contribute to the semantic content of the utterance, but this would blur its distinction from that of ‘Author’ and would lead to a further proliferation of speaker role types (cf. Levinson 1988).

More importantly, by lumping together examples such as (2), (12) and (13) with (7), we would ignore the observation that in the former examples, the

5 This is an elicited example but the crucial observations to be made about its semantics are twofold: first, the embedded proposition is not factive but represents a hypothetical reality (i.e., the speaker does not confirm the veracity of the proposition) and, second, the third person subject referent does not necessarily intend to scare the first person object referent. These two factors indicate that the framing verb odokas- ‘frighten, scare’ signals an evaluation on behalf of the current speaker, as was confirmed by Chikako Senge and Masa Yamaguchi (p.c.), but I have no data on the occurrence of constructions as in (12) in natural discourse. Given that these native speakers also confirm that the embedded proposition may equally be framed by ‘told a lie’ (uso wo itta, denying the veracity of the proposition) and ‘claimed’ (iihatta, doubting the veracity of the proposition), Japanese appears to provide ample empirical evidence for the expression of speaker evaluations in reported speech.
current speaker attitudes ‘I do not agree with the truth of the message’, ‘I doubt the truth of the message’ etc. form part of the grammatically encoded meaning of the construction, whereas in languages like English they arise in structurally much less unambiguous dynamic communicative interaction. Although the relation between the two types may well be seen as different stages of a grammaticalization cline, synchronically they represent an opposition between semantics and pragmatic inference.

In most languages of the world quotative constructions have a form similar to that in (14). (Unless otherwise indicated, in this chapter square brackets ‘[]’ will represent constructions, i.e. complexes of meaning and form, and round brackets ‘()’ represent semantic or notional concepts. The representations do not necessarily reflect linear order).

(14) \[
\text{[[proposition } p \text{] PARTICLE/LINK speaker,-SAY-addressee,]} \]

\[
\text{message} \quad \text{source}
\]

In addition, many languages have the construction in (15).

(15) \[
\text{[[proposition } p \text{] PARTICLE]}
\]

\[
\text{message}
\]
In the majority of cases the element indicated in (15) as PARTICLE is either similar to that in (14), a pre-/suffixed form exclusively encoding reportativity or a grammaticalized form of the verb SAY (Aikhenvald 2004; cf. also Güldemann 2008). Although for some languages only a single (basic) quotative construction is reported (see section 4), in most languages several language-internally opposing quotative constructions may be distinguished (Coulmas 1986; Evans 2009): compare English (16a-e).

(16a) He said: “I am here”
(16b) He said (that) he was there
(16c) He maintained (that) he was there
(16d) He was like, “I am here”
(16e) According to him he was there

What all these constructions have in common is that they attribute the conveyed information to a narrating source other than the current speaker, as was indicated in (9a,b). However, as indicated in section 2, this does not mean that every utterance containing some narrating source and something that was said is necessarily a quotative construction (cf. 17).

(17a) Oh, that John-was-cutting-down-banana-trees rumor was exceptionally lame.
What is necessary for understanding a construction as a quotative is that the source of the proposition is attributed to the discourse of another speaker (McGregor 1994). In the literature the act of attributing reported discourse to some other speaker has been given many labels such as ‘demonstrating’ (Clark and Gerrig 1990) ‘distancing’ (De Brabanter and Dendale 2008; Güldemann this volume) and ‘evidentiality’ (Besnier 1993; Chafe and Nichols 1986; Clift 2006; Guentchéva 1996; Haßler 2002; Hill and Irvine 1993; cf. also Jakobson 1957). I will adopt the latter analysis, where evidentiality can be defined as “[...] a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information. [...] [T]his covers the way in which the information was acquired, without necessarily relating to the degree of speaker’s certainty concerning the statement or whether it’s true or not” (Aikhenvald 2004: 3) (also see Mushin 2001: ch. 2 or Rooryck 2001 for a literature review). About a quarter of the world’s languages (Aikhenvald...
2004: 1) encode this category morphologically. Although language internally the function of morphological, that is, grammaticalized strategies and periphrastic strategies (i.e., constructions which express an evidential meaning with verbs of saying, hearing, smelling etc.) may certainly differ (Aikhenvald 2004: 139), they always specify some source of information. Constructions which encode a narrative source of information are quotative constructions. This analysis leads to the definition in (18), a slightly adapted version of the one in (9b).

(18) Quotative construction

\([\text{SOURCE construction MESSAGE construction}]_{\text{evidentiality}}\)

In (18), the label evidentiality is used as shorthand for reportative (i.e., narrative source) evidentiality (Aihenvald, 2003, 2004), but as I will explore in sections 4 and 5, more fine-grained distinctions have to be made.

However, evidentiality is not the only grammatical category that is expressed in quotative constructions. As the examples in (2), (12) and (13),

6 For example, Tariana is a language in which evidentiality is obligatorily morphologically expressed. The bolded morphemes in (a)-(c) indicate that the speaker bases her utterance on visual evidence (she saw it) (a), non-visual evidence (e.g., she heard Cecilia scolding the dog) (b), and was told about it (c).

(a) Ceci \(\text{ñinu-nuku}\) \(\text{du-kwisa-ka}\)
C. dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3sgf-scold-REC.P.VIS
‘Cecilia scolded the dog’

(b) Ceci \(\text{ñinu-nuku}\) \(\text{du-kwisa-mahka}\)
C. dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3sgf-scold-REC.P.NONVIS
‘Cecilia scolded the dog’

(c) Ceci \(\text{ñinu-nuku}\) \(\text{du-kwisa-pidaka}\)
C. dog-TOP.NON.A/S 3sgf-scold-REC.P.REP
‘Cecilia scolded the dog’ (Aikhenvald 2003: 133-134)
and the possible interpretations of (6) and (7) indicate, a full account of quotative constructions should include current speaker-evaluative meaning, which was defined in the introduction as in (19).

(19) **A current speaker-evaluative meaning in a quotative construction**
Evaluation of the current speaker of the relationship between the reported speaker and some proposition \( p \).

Speaker-evaluative meanings or speaker attitudes have figured prominently in the European tradition of analyzing sequence-of-tense phenomena and, for example, the German subjunctive in quotation (cf. Russ 1994). In this chapter I use the label ‘speaker attitudes’ as a pre-theoretical notion that may either refer to evaluations by the current speaker or the reported speaker. I will follow Palmer (1986) in defining grammaticalized speaker attitudes as modality (although the category of modality itself also includes other types of meaning).

The definition in (19) needs to be further qualified. For a reported message to be evaluated by the current speaker as dubious, untrue or terrifying, she first needs to establish it as a speech act by the reported speaker, and in doing so qualify it as an event that, according to the reported speaker, is true/untrue or possibly true (cf. McGregor 1994). It is this antagonistic relationship between the evaluation of the proposition by the reported speaker – that is, presenting the proposition in her (‘original’) utterance as true, false, dubious etc., and the evaluation by the current
speaker – that establishes the current speaker attitude in a quotative. Although the modal element in a quotative is, as per (19), thus qualifying the relationship between the reported speaker and the proposition, it can only do so by establishing a relation between both the current speaker and the reported speaker and the current speaker and the proposition.

This tension is particularly evident in utterances of mistaken believe which may coincide with quotation but are not restricted to quotative constructions: compare (21) from Nyulnyul (Non-Pama-Nyungan, Kimberley region, Western Australia), its English counterpart in (20), and the grammaticalized construction in the Kayardild (Tangkic, northern Australia) example (22), in which this antagonistic relation is signaled by a ‘counterfactual’ suffix.

(20) Everyone believes you hit him, but I don’t

(21) wali-in    irr-mungk   juy-in    mindam-Ø
     everyone-ERG  3pl-BELIEVE  2sg-ERG  2sg:hit-3Msg

ngay-in    arriyangk
     1sg-ERG    no

‘They all think you hit him, but I don’t’ (McGregor, 2004: 106)

(22) kurri-ja    manharr-iy   maraka   dangka-karran-ji
     see-ACT    bark.torch-OBJ   CTRFAC  man-GEN-OBJ
‘(They) saw a bark torch, and wrongly thought it was the man’s.’

(Evans 1995: 378-80)\(^7\)

Similarly, in the Lele example (2), the dubitative particle can only be conceivably predicated over the message ‘He is a Lele man’ if the reported speaker contended that this message was true.

In many quotative utterances the current speaker attitude may not be explicitly marked, simply because it is irrelevant in the discourse situation. In these cases it may be inferred that the lack of qualification of the message on behalf of the current speaker of the evaluation of the reported speaker either entails concurrence with his point of view, or suggests objectivity. As such, absence or presence of an explicitly encoded speaker attitude co-varies with such linguistic and extra-linguistic variables as the range of available modal and evidential constructions in the language but also politeness and genre (e.g., news reports). The main thesis of this chapter is that these evidential and modal meanings are represented in, interact with and fundamentally shape the semantics of quotative constructions. In languages in which there is more than a single quotative construction these meanings may be used to characterize some specialized quotative structures and elsewhere we may expect regular interactions between modal constructions

\(^7\) Thanks to Nick Evans for referring me to this example. For a number of languages, at least, these markers seem to be more properly analyzed as ‘suspending commitment’ on behalf of the current speaker, without necessarily asserting she holds the reported belief to be wrong (Nick Evans p.c.).
and quotative constructions, which we may use to predict possible grammaticalization pathways.

3.1 Modality and Evidentiality

I will now briefly discuss how the view presented here fits in with current debates in the research on evidentiality and modality, and introduce a number of relevant notions that will facilitate the cross-linguistic survey in section 4 and the integrated analysis in section 5. The literature on modality is vast but I will focus on three questions: Which types of modality can we distinguish? How are modality and evidentiality expressed? How does the category of modality relate to that of evidentiality?

The topic of modality has long attracted researchers working in both logical semantic and functionalist-typological paradigms (for an overview see Bybee et al. 1994; Bybee and Fleischman, 1995; Palmer 1986). Both fields seem to agree that there are roughly two types of modal meanings: epistemic and deontic modality. The first category relates to a knowledge state about a particular ‘State of Affairs’ (SoA) and consequently about truth, that is, whether the SoA is true, not true or possibly true according to some evaluating entity. Deontic modal expressions describe SoAs that are (un)desirable, to be pursued or to be avoided, that is, SoAs that ought to become true or not according to some evaluating entity. Hypothetical modal meanings, which may or may not happen – an example being the
apprehensive meaning in Japanese (13) – may combine epistemic and deontic properties (Lichtenberk 1995; Verstraete 2005). As such, current speaker-evaluative meanings about reported messages like the ones encountered above correspond to well-established categories in the literature on modality.

Although it is not uncommon in the literature to treat evidentiality as a subcategory of epistemic modality, I will assume that evidentiality constitutes a separate grammatical category from epistemic modality (also see Aikhenvald 2004; Boye 2010; Boye and Harder 2009; Kockelman 2004) and that this category may be expressed through a range of different strategies, as I will exemplify in sections 4 and 5. Although there is no a priori reason to assume that indicating how a speaker came to know about some information has any bearing on the way in which she evaluates this information (Boye 2010; also cf. Evans & Wilkins 2000), drawing clear boundaries between epistemic modality and evidentiality has proven to be an elusive task in many accounts of evidentiality (cf. Chafe and Nichols 1986; Dendale & Tasmowski (2001); Van der Auwera and Plungian 1994; also see the discussion in Mushin 2001). In Tariana (23a, b), for example, Aikhenvald (2004) analyses the evidential reportative marker in (23b) as indication that the speaker “does not vouch for the information reported”, as opposed to the more objective (23a) (Aikhenvald 2004: 139).

(23a) ‘o-he: gi na-tú
A similar observation has been made about indirect speech, which researchers maintain generally expresses more subjective information than direct speech (Coulmas 1986). These accounts derive modality as a secondary meaning from grammatical elements and morphemes signaling evidentiality. Other researchers have indicated modality as the basic meaning of constructions with other grammatical features. For example, Frajzyngier (1995) builds a strong case for analyzing complementizers as markers of epistemic modality, with their syntactic subordinating function as a derived feature.

As will be shown in section 4, the morphological strategies for encoding evidentiality and modality are very similar, encompassing verb inflection, affixation, adverbial modification and multi-clausal constructions. Many of these markers and constructions are polysemous and we should expect to find similar polysemies in quotative constructions.

---

8 In this sense the idiomatic glosses in (23a,b) are counterintuitive and I would like to propose that (25a) is more properly translated as direct speech and (23b) as indirect speech, which also reflects the assumed iconic correlation between morphological complexity and increased subjective meaning: cf. Bybee et al. (1994).
which combine evidential and modal meanings. The relevance of modality is evidenced by the grammatically encoded current speaker-evaluative meanings, as encountered in Lele, Kwaza and Japanese.

Several authors have identified quotative constructions as expressions of evidentiality (cf. Clift 2006; Feuillet 1997; Haßler 2002). In these studies, however, evidentiality is generally viewed as a rather monolithic category, signalling ‘linguistic evidence’ or ‘reportative’ (Aikhenvald 2004). My approach to evidentiality differs slightly in that, in the present chapter, reportative evidentiality should rather be seen as a possible range of values expressing different ways of relating to the alleged original speech moment, the ‘source’ moment. Whereas the modal meaning in a quotative evaluates the content of the message, the evidential meaning relates to the message as an utterance, a physical world entity. This is the proposal I will aim to flesh out in the remainder of this chapter.

An additional complicating factor for determining basic meanings for particular structures is formed by pragmatic processes such as pragmatic stress as in the English (1c) and the notorious German Kojunktiv II (cf. 23c,d), which seem to introduce a sense of distancing or lack of commitment (De Brabanter and Dendaele 2008).

(23c)  Er  sagt-t,   er  sei   krank
       say-PRES.3sg  SUBJ.I  ill
       ‘He said he was ill’

(23d)  Er  sagt,   er  wäre   krank
       say-PRES.3sg  SUBJ.II  ill
       ‘He maintained he was ill’

The difficulty in the literature to establish a basic meaning for the subjunctive in (23d) (for a discussion, see Russ 1994: 185-186) and its restriction to particular registers (cf. news reports) make it unlikely that the opposition between the two subjunctives in (23c,d) semantically encode a specific current speaker attitude. The conclusion that the current speaker attitude in (1c) arises from pragmatic inference is clearly indicated by the observation that it can be cancelled, cf. (1c’-c’’’).

(1c’)  John maintained that he had told the truth and I really do think he has
(1c’’’) John maintained that he had told the truth and I am afraid that he might be right
(1c’’’’) John maintained that he had told the truth. Wouldn’t that be something?
4. **Speaker attitudes and reported messages: a sample study**

4.1 *Introduction*

In this section I survey the different ways in which current speaker attitudes in quotatives may be encoded in the languages of the world. Any such survey is faced with a number of methodological problems. First, most of the available evidence has to be pieced together from scattered parts of descriptive grammars which generally do not claim to give an exhaustive account of quotation in the respective language to begin with. Second, even if the respective study does treat modality and quotation in detail, it may not be straightforward to identify appropriate examples, especially since many of the relevant constructions appear to be very low in frequency in natural discourse. For instance, the constructed example in (24) was found marginally acceptable by some of the people I have discussed it with, while others instantly rejected its grammaticality.

(24) ³John lied that it was raining outside

Should this lead us to conclude that English may not co-encode the meanings ‘John said this’ and ‘I think that message is untrue’ in a single
uncoordinated construction?\(^{10}\) And is the unacceptability of an example such as in (24), due to lexical, constructional or pragmatic properties? If these questions already arise for arguably the single most described language, what are the prospects for a newly documented language? Third, since some relevant contexts may be very specific, certain secondary meanings may have gone unnoticed. For example, a language may normally apply a standard quotative construction in quotation but may use an inferential construction if the current speaker finds the message dubious or otherwise unreliable. A number of authors have indeed indicated such secondary usages (e.g., Frjzyngier 1991, 2001), but further research may well show more patterns than I have been able to identify below.

Despite these obvious drawbacks, however, the grammatical descriptions indicate clear recurring semantic and structural cross-linguistic tendencies with respect to the encoding and usage of speaker attitudes in quotative constructions. For each of the languages in the sample I have minimally surveyed the following properties, as far as I have been able to determine them on the basis of their respective descriptive grammar:

Number of quotative constructions: How many different quotative constructions does the grammar list?

\(^{10}\) This does not seem to be the case, since (24’) appears to be perfectly acceptable for most speakers.

(24’) John falsely claimed that it was raining outside
Number of framing verbs: Does the language allow only one framing verb, a closed class of a number of framing verbs or an open class of framing verbs?

Reportativity: Does the language have any grammaticalized quotation markers?

Evidentiality: Does the language have any grammaticalized evidential markers?

Does the language have any categories that specifically appear in (extended) quotative constructions or acquire a specific meaning in quotative constructions, for example, logophoricity?

Modal inflection 1: Are there any inflectional, verbal or clitic categories that have modality as a primary meaning? Dual-evaluation constructions (e.g., frustrative) are included in this category.

Modal inflection 2: Are there any inflectional or clitic categories that have modality as a non-basic, derived meaning?

Does the language have adverbs or other modifying markers?

Does the language allow epistemic or epistemic-deontic modification by means of adverbs or markers?

The language sample consists of the languages listed in table 1:

Table 1 The Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian (Indo-European, South-Eastern Slavic)</td>
<td>Scatton (1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duna (Trans-New Guinea, Duna-Bogaya)</td>
<td>San Roque (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki (Altaic, Northern Evenki)</td>
<td>Nedjalkov (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewe (Niger-Congo, Gbe)</td>
<td>Ameka (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (Indo-European, Germanic)</td>
<td>Jung (1971); Russ (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarawara (Brazil, Arauan)</td>
<td>Dixon (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese (isolate)</td>
<td>Martin (1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolyma Yukaghir (Paleo-Siberian, Yukaghir)</td>
<td>Maslova (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean (isolate)</td>
<td>Sohn (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koromfé (Niger-Congo, Kurumfe)</td>
<td>Rennison (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwaza (unidentified, Brazil)</td>
<td>Van der Voort (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lele (Niger-Congo, Mokole)</td>
<td>Frajzyngier (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lezgian (Nakho-Daghestanian, Lezgic)</td>
<td>Haspelmath (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndnyuka (Pidgin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toqabaqita (Austronesian, Oceanic)</td>
<td>Lichtenberk (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish (Altaic, Southern Turcic)</td>
<td>Kornfilt (1997); Lewis (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvaluan (Austronesian, Ellicean)</td>
<td>Besnier (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wari (Brazil, Chapacura-Wanham, Madeira)</td>
<td>Everett and Kern (1997)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows a quantitative summary of the results (as indicated above, absolute numbers and labels should be interpreted as hypothetical classifications based on the best available information about the respective language rather than definite features of the respective language). The columns MI1 to MA list the modal/evaluative meanings available in the respective grammar. Due to lack of space, the results table only shows the number of different modal categories/evaluative meanings, where relevant specific constructions are illustrated in section 4.5. Perhaps more importantly, the columns are a first illustration of some fundamental building blocks of method for identifying speaker evaluative-meanings in
quotation I will introduce in section 5. In summary, the columns list as follows: (Q) the number of quotative constructions listed in the grammar and (F) whether the source construction encoded with a verb, how many are listed in the grammar ('open’ indicates that there is no closed set of verba dicendi in the grammar). The column (R) indicates whether the language displays grammatical (i.e., non-periphrastic) constructions for encoding quotation and (E) whether the language has grammaticalized evidentials. Column (C) indicates whether and how many constructions are only used (in the intended meaning) in quotative construction (i.e., complementizers that are only used in quotative constructions); logophoricity is by far the most common category in this column (see section 4.4). The remaining columns (MI-MA) list the number distinctions of modal/evaluative meanings reported in the grammar: (MI) shows the number of inflectional, verbal or other modal morphological distinctions, (MI2) lists a subset of these markers with a secondary meaning (e.g., ‘Irrealis may also express doubt’), (A/M) shows the existence of modifiers, adverbial (A) or not (M), and finally, (MA) lists the set of modifiers expressing epistemic meanings listed in the grammar. Qualitative descriptions of the results will follow in sections 4.2 to 4.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>MI1</th>
<th>MI2</th>
<th>A/M</th>
<th>MA</th>
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<td>F</td>
<td>R</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Q**  Number of quotative constructions: How many different quotative constructions does the grammar list?

**F**  Number of framing verbs: Does the language allow only one framing verb, a closed class of a number of framing verbs or an open class of framing verbs?

**R**  Reportativity: Does the language have any grammaticalized quotation markers?

**E**  Evidentiality: Does the language have any grammaticalized evidential markers?

**C**  Does the language have any categories that specifically appear in (extended) quotative constructions or acquire a specific meaning in quotative constructions, for example, logophoricity?

**MI1**  Modal inflection 1: Are there any inflectional, verbal or clitic categories that have modality as a primary meaning? Dual-evaluation constructions (e.g., frustrative) are included in this category.
MI2  Modal inflection 2: Are there any inflectional or clitic categories that have modality as a non-basic, derived meaning?

A/M  Does the language have adverbs (A) or other modifying markers (M)?

MA  Does the language allow epistemic or epistemic-deontic modification by means of adverbs or markers?

Section 4.2 presents an overview of the findings of the typological survey carried out in this chapter. The remaining subsections 4.3 to 4.7 describe the main grammatical categories involved and are aimed at the reader who wishes to learn in detail how the results in 4.2 were arrived at. Section 4.8 is a brief summary of the whole section.

4.2  *Overview of the results*

In this section the structure of quotative constructions and particularly their expression of modality and evidentiality in the sample languages in table 1 are surveyed. In order to integrate these results, I will now further refine the models of quotative constructions in (9) and (14) in order to specify *how* current speaker-evaluative meanings are expressed in the sample. As indicated in section 3, I regard speaker-evaluative meanings as examples of the grammatical category of modality and in the remaining part of this chapter ‘modality’ will refer to speaker attitudes unless otherwise indicated.
As a first generalization, consider (25a,b), a schematic representation of the quotative constructions in the sample (the particular order of the constructions is cross-linguistically irrelevant). Each language appears to have at least one or more constructions as in (25a) (a periphrastic quotative construction) and/or (25b) (a reportative construction, i.e., a quotative construction in which the particular source is not specified).

(25a)  [[Source construction] [SAY construction] [Link] [Reported message]]_quotative construction

(25b)  [[Reported message] [Reportative evidential construction]]_quotative construction

I assume that each of these elements can take on a modal role, that is, express a speaker attitude, represented in (26a-f) by ‘[µ]’. Let us go over each of these possible constructions.

(26a)  [[Source construction]µ [SAY construction] [Link] [Reported message]]_quotative construction

There are two possible candidates for grammatical categories that influence a modal interpretation of the ‘Source’ construction: person and
Sources representing discourse participants at the current speech moment (i.e., local pronouns, first and second person) have a commitment enhancing effect to the truth of the message (for details, see 4.4). This effect is commonly mistaken for modal semantics. Little is currently known about the effect of honorific markers in the source construction. A hypothetical grammaticalization path could be that a respected source (i.e., a referent marked with an honorific morpheme) is an authoritative source, which implies that the message is true, but I am currently unfamiliar with such a case.

Although person effects play a very important role in the interpretation of speaker attitudes in quotative constructions, no grammaticalized current speaker-evaluative meanings have been found in the present survey. Yet, this would have to be regarded as an interesting direction for further research.

(26b) \[[\text{Source construction}] \ [\text{SAY construction}]_\mu \ [\text{Link}] \ [\text{Reported message}]\]_\text{quotative construction}

The expression of modality in the SAY construction has emerged as one of the most prolific strategies in the sample. Current speaker-evaluative meanings may be encoded in three ways in this part of the quotative

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11 It should be noted that the representation in (25-26) is highly schematized e.g. in pro-drop languages, the source construction may be expressed as agreement on the SAY construction.
construction: (1) choice of the framing verb itself, (2) modification of the framing verb through adverbs or particles, and (3) modal inflection on the framing verb. The first strategy was exemplified in Japanese, but is probably one of the most common strategies, especially in the languages which have an open framing verb class (i.e., column F in table 2). The second strategy is common in languages with adverbs (the adverb ‘truly’ appears to be the most frequent in the sample). The third strategy was found in, for example, (40) the frustrative in Kwaza.

(26c) [[Source construction] [SAY construction] [Link]ₘ [Reported message]ₘ]_quotative construction

Although the ‘Link’ is certainly not a feature of all quotative constructions, in the languages and constructions in which it is used it is frequently less semantically empty than often assumed. The data in Frajzyngier (1995) are examples of this strategy in which the complementizer seems to directly encode modality (also see Svennevig et al., this volume on Norwegian complementizers). Russian is another language that employs this strategy: compare (26c’)-(26c’’’). In example (26c’) the standard complementizer čto is used, possibly reflecting agreement with the truth of the message by the current speaker. In (26c’’), however, complementizer budto ‘as if’ expresses that the current speaker does not believe the message. Complementizer kak ‘how/like’ in (26c’’’) indicates that the current speaker is not directly
relaying the utterance of the reported speaker, but is rephrasing it. Under my present analysis the opposition between (26c’) and (26c’’’) is not a modal one, but one of evidentiality. I will return to this aspect of my proposal in section 5.

(26c’) on skaza-l čto u nix vyrosl-i

3Msg say-PST.M CMPL at 3pl.GEN

grow.PFV.PST-pl

bol’š-ie tykv-y

big-pl pumpkin-pl

‘He said that they grew large pumpkins’

(26c’’) on skaza-l budto u nix vyrosl-i

3Msg say-PST.M CMPL at 3pl.GEN grow.PFV.PST-pl

bol’š-ie tykv-y

big-pl pumpkin-pl

‘He said that they grew large pumpkins’

(26c’’’) on skaza-l kak u nix vyrosl-i

3Msg say-PST.M CMPL at 3pl.GEN

grow.PFV.PST-pl bol’š-ie tykv-y

big-pl pumpkin-pl

‘He said that they grew large pumpkins’
Modality in the reported message construction could come in two forms: (1) modification of the entire message (e.g., through an adverb or modal particle), and (2) application of specific elements within the reported message. The Lele example (2) could be interpreted as containing the first strategy, but we may similarly analyze this construction as modifying the entire quotative construction (cf. footnote 7). It may be hypothesized that quotative constructions in which the reported message is a nominalized clause, or in which the reported message appears to be treated as an argument,12 are most prone to adopting this strategy, as in these languages’ reported messages are represented as those constructions which most prototypically undergo modification, that is, nouns. Currently, however, I have insufficient data to explore this hypothesis. The second strategy could be illustrated by logophoric markers and the neutralization of honorifics in reported messages in Korean, but both phenomena do not necessarily play a role in the encoding of modality.

12 One example in which the reported message appears to be marked as an argument is the Martuthurina example (26d’), in which the reported message is represented as an object with accusative case:

(26d’) yartapalyu wangka-nguru parna-ngka-rru others say-PRES head-LOC-NOW
kangka-lla-a, yartapalyu wangka-nguru carry-PAST-ACC others say-PRES
warryayi-lalha-a
drag-PAST-ACC
‘Some say they carried it on their heads, others say they dragged it’ (Dench, 1995: 243)
The two final strategies, (26e) and (26f) are functionally similar to (26d) and (26b), respectively, in that both (26e) and (26d) involve modification of the reported message construction and that in (26f) and (26b) the construction containing the reported message and the SAY meaning are being modified.

(26e) \[[\text{Reported message}]_{\text{\mu}} [\text{Reportative construction}]\]_{\text{quotative construction}}

(26f) \[[\text{Reported message}] [\text{Reportative construction}]_{\text{\mu}}\]_{\text{quotative construction}}

None of these modal strategies may be viewed in isolation, that is, in some languages some modal expression in the SAY construction may necessarily combine with a particular modal ‘Link’, but the attested strategies in (26a-f) are all independently found in the sample.

Indeed, the types of modal values in quotative constructions that have been identified in these sections have been remarkably similar: the most elaborate domain in which distinctions can be made is in (dis)confirming the truth of the reported message (e.g., ‘I consider the message true/untrue/didn’t expect it before but found out that it was true (mirative)/state that it failed to become true’ (frustrative)). Few languages can encode doubt on behalf of the current speaker (dubitative modality) as explicitly as in the Lele example (2), but in many cases this is unnecessary for a dubitative meaning to arise; the simple absence of a truth-encoding complementizer or asserting (present) tense may signal lack of commitment.
to the truth, thus implying doubt. This is a pragmatic implication, not a semantically encoded (i.e., modal) meaning, given the observation that it is not uncommon that what is being described as dubitative inflection can be used in cases in which the speaker does believe the message to be true (i.e., the implication of doubt can be cancelled). This leads to the conclusion that ‘truth’ meanings are more basic and widespread than ‘doubt’ meanings in quotative constructions. I will refer to all truth meanings as doxic modality.

In the third type of modal, which is even rarer than explicitly encoded dubitative modality in the sample, the current speaker indicates that she would (not) want the message to be(come) true. In this type of construction the reported message is presented as a hypothetical event which is (un)desirable to the current speaker, as encoded in Japanese (13), and arguably reflected in the remarkable reference pattern in Manumbu (35). This meaning is very closely related to, for example, apprehensional mood (‘lest’), but in the present sample I have not been able to identify current speaker framed apprehensional epistemics in quotative constructions. I will refer to this type as volitive modality. A tentative representation in an implicational scale is (27), which, as all other generalizing claims below, should presently be treated as a descriptive hypothesis based on the small set of sample languages surveyed here.

(27) Doxic > Dubitative > Volitive
This tentative implicational scale assumes that unmarked/minimally marked strategies relate to doxic modality and that dubitative and volitive modality are encoded by either similar or more complex strategies. Typologically, it may be expected that languages with current speaker-evaluative meanings have either only doxic, doxic and dubitative or doxic, dubitative and volitive modality but no other combinations. Again, the question of whether this impressionistic hypothesis will survive scrutiny requires a more substantial typological study than I have been able to pursue in this chapter.

4.3 Number and functions of quotative constructions

The number of quotative constructions in the sample languages ranges from as few as just one in, for example, Ngarinyin and Semelai, to four in languages such as Koromfé and Lezgian. A remarkable tendency in the sample is best described with the implicational scale in (28).

(28) Direct speech/reportativity > indirect speech > insubordinated speech

In words: if a language employs only one type of quotative construction it is either a bi-clausal direct speech strategy (e.g., a ‘X says’-clause and an appositional message clause) or a grammaticalized (reportative) strategy (i.e., a reportative morpheme). If there are more constructions available, these are most likely indirect speech constructions. If both/all three types are
found, the language may also employ an insubordinated strategy as well. This observation is further evidence for rejecting a priori distinctions between grammaticalized and non-grammaticalized strategies when it comes to the encoding of quotation.

I will interpret the quotatives as indicated in the second column of table 2 as paradigmatic oppositions, which prompts the question as to what the semantic oppositions encoded by the different quotatives are. Although we need not expect a one-to-one correlation between the number of quotative constructions and the co-encoding of speaker attitudes, the literature suggests that semantic distinctions in quotatives in languages that have direct and indirect speech can generally be captured with the notion of ‘objectivity’ (see Coulmas 1986).

In the sample, Semelai appears to be the language in which the possibilities for encoding the relation between the reported and the current speakers are maximally restricted. The language has only a single (grammaticalized) quotative construction. It has no framing verbs and in all examples in which modal markers are used, they express an evaluation on behalf of the reported speaker. However, the three languages with the most different quotative constructions – Koromfe, Lezgian and Toqabaqita –, are not the languages for which the most fine-grained explicitly encoded speaker attitudes have been reported.

It is important to bear in mind, though, that of all numbers in table 2, the exact number of constructions in the column Q may be the least
indicative. This is so because non- (primarily) quotative constructions may be used to encode reports and not everything that looks like a quotative construction is (exclusively) a quotative construction. For example, Martin (1975: 666) describes a process in Japanese where certain nominalizing constructions “[…] may be marked as if quoted”, a process he terms ‘quotationalization’ (see also Oshima and Sano this volume). In Manumbu, quotative constructions may be “[…] employed to express internal speech and thought, desire and intention of third person, reason and purpose and a few other related meanings” (Aikhenvald 2008: 484). A similarly multifunctional construction has been found in Ngarinyin (Rumsey 1982), and is also common in many Papuan languages (Lila San Roque, p.c.). Reported thought and reported speech are also co-encoded in the same constructions in a number of American languages such as Wari (Everett and Kern 1997) and Aguaruna (Larson 1978). Although I have not addressed reported thought in the discussion here, it should be clear that much of the analysis presented in this chapter can also be applied to reported thought with some modifications, as was also indicated by the close relation between the present topic and constructions as the mistaken belief construction in (22).

4.4 Categories in the de dicto domain
Quotative constructions constitute a specific structural and semantic environment, within which particular meanings tend to grammaticalize. Frajzyngier (1991) refers to this grammatical environment as the *de dicto* domain. Examples of frequently occurring grammaticalization processes in this domain are insubordination, that is, ‘subordinated’ clauses without a ‘main clause’ (Evans 2007) (see example 29b), but also some of the modal meanings arising from the application of certain tense and mood categories in quotative constructions (see section 4.5). A number of languages in the sample have grammatical categories that are either exclusively found in quotative constructions, or acquire a specific meaning when appearing in a quotative construction. In the results table these languages are indicated in column C. One such category is that of logophoricity which in the sample is attested in such genetically diverse languages as Ewe, Lao, Lezgian and West-Greenlandic. The primary function of a logophoric marker in quotative constructions in these languages is to indicate that the referent in the framing clause, the source construction, is the same as the one in the embedded clause, the message construction. While Lao, Lezgian and West-Greenlandic use a reflexive construction to encode co-referentiality with the reported speaker in a framed clause, Ewe has a marker that is exclusively used for this purpose.

(29) kofi bé ye- a- dzó
    K. say LOG IRR leave
‘Kofi said that he would leave’ (Ameka 1991: 62)

Although its main function appears to be deictic/anaphoric, that is, keeping track of discourse participants in a narrated event, a marginal secondary usage of logophoricity has also been reported. In Tuburi (Niger-Congo) logophoric pronouns may sometimes head intransitivised clauses signalling reportativity: see (30).

(30) sārā dūs sō

LOG disperse thus

‘They, [the ancestors] then dispersed/spread out’ (Dimmendaal 2001:136)

A second quotative specific category is the subjunctive in German which is used in framed clauses in quotative constructions, although Jung (1971) observes that this rule is prescriptive rather than descriptive of spontaneous discourse.

A more general and fundamental category that interacts with speaker attitudes in quotative constructions is person. An interesting case is that of languages with grammatical honorific marking (in the sample: Japanese, Korean and Lao). Korean distinguishes six different speech levels: plain, intimate, familiar, blunt, polite, deferential plus a seventh, neutral form (Sohn 1994: 8-11). “[T]he neutral level appears in quotative clauses
irrespective of the social status of the addressee” (Sohn 1994: 341), that is, there is no honorific distinction in quotation.

However, we cannot approach grammatical person in quotation with a monolithic view. For example, there is a clear asymmetry between the discourse participant (first and second person) and non-participant person (third person) distinctions. For example, a first person present tense framing clause like ‘I am telling you…’ could be interpreted as ‘I am asserting that \( p \) is true’ (cf. Huttar and Huttar 1994: 581 on a similar construction in Ndyuka). This effect is not a coincidental, language-specific phenomenon in English, but may also be attested in many different languages. For example, Donaldson (1980: 240) reports that the ‘believed true’ marker –ŋadharga in the Australian language Ngiyambaa (Pama-Nyungan) diachronically derives from the verb SAY inflected for first person. Compare also the Lezgian (31) and Aguaruna (Peru; Jivaroan) (32), which combine first person framing clauses with adverbs meaning ‘true’.

(31) \( za-q^h \), \( Nadja, düz laha-j-t’a, či xür-e \)

\( I\)-POESS N right say-AOP-COND we:GEN village-INESS

\( lišanlu ruš wa-j-di tir \)
betrothed girl be.in-PTP-SBST COP:PST
‘Honestly [litt.: if (I) say (it) rightly], Nadja, I used to have a fiancée
in our village’ (Haspelmath 1993: 308)

(32)  Nueva Vidak       tikima yaigchi,       junak       dekas
     N. V.-TOP         very it-is-small that-OBJ-TOP truly
     yaktauchin         tajai
     village-small-OBJ I-say

‘New Life is really small. I say it is a really small village’ (Larson
1978: 55)

A similar process is also reported by Lee (2007:379), who cites a
description in Martin (1975) of the particle yo, meaning “‘I want you to
know’, ‘Believe (you) me . . .’ , ‘I tell you’, ‘I’d say’ or ‘Let me tell you’”.
‘As implied in these translations, enhancing one’s role as the deliverer of
information indicates the speaker’s desire to be in a superior position over
the partner with respect to the utterance contents, implying ‘I am sure of this
more than you are’ or ‘You did not know this, did you’ (Lee 2007: 379).
Another case in point is the following description of the Cupeño reportative
marker ku’ut: ‘A few sentences are attested where =ku’ut does not seem to
have a “reportative” function but instead seems to challenge the validity of a
statement by another’ (Hill 2005: 292): see (33).
You say you’re going to go to a dance tonight? (Faye’s translation: You say you want to go to a dance tonight.) (Hill 2005: 292)

The meaning ‘contesting the truth’ seems to derive directly from the combination of address (second person) and the quotative construction. In addition, the fact that Hill translates (33) as an interrogative sentence is significant as it underlines the illocutionary function ‘requesting confirmation of the statement’.

The indicated asymmetry between first person (and second person in interrogative clauses) and non-first person (second in declarative sentences/third/hearsay) in quotatives thus seems to interact with particular modal meanings (also cf. Curnow 2002), which is most clearly expressed in languages that have what several researchers have referred to as ‘conjunct/disjunct’ systems (Bickel and Nichols 2007: 223-224; Hale 1980). In these languages person agreement is grouped into ‘conjunct’ forms, generally referring to discourse participants (i.e., first person/second person) and non-participants, that is, third person (or sometimes non-first person), called ‘disjunct’. In Tsafiki (Barbacoan), this opposition may also be used to express logophoricity (cf. 34a,b), and even ‘unintentionality’ (cf. 34c).
(34a)  *ya mantoka jiyo e tie*

    ya man-to=ka ji-yo-e ti-e

    3 other-earth=LOC go-CONJ\(^{13}\)-DECL say-DECL

    ‘He, said that he went to Santo Domingo.’ (Dickinson 2000: 385)

(34b)  *ya mantoka jie tie*

    ya man-to=ka ji-e ti-e

    3 other-earth=LOC go-DECL say-DECL

    ‘He, said that he went to Santo Domingo.’ (ibid.)

(34c)  *la yaka machitechi poreie*

    la ya=ka machite=chi pore-i-e

    1MASC 3=ACC machete=INSTR cut-DISJ-DECL

    ‘I cut him (unintentionally) with the machete.’ (Dickinson 2000: 387)

When using the conjunct form (as in 34a) the referent ‘he’ is understood to be co-referential with the reported speaker. In the absence of the conjunct marker, the referent ‘he’ is understood to be someone else than the speaker. Similar to Tuburi (30), the pair (34a,b) exemplifies how reference tracking morphology may develop into specific grammatical marking in quotative

\(^{13}\) Dickinson (2000) refers to this form as ‘congruent’ versus ‘non-congruent’.
constructions. The meaning ‘unintentionally’ in (34c) is a secondary meaning of disjunct marker in Tsafiki. Although not exemplified in (Dickinson 2000), it would be interesting to see if this meaning could arise in quotative constructions meaning ‘unintentionally/inadvertently say’.

Less grammaticalized person effects may be observed in Manumbu (cf. 35), where the unusual person reference in the framed clause may be assumed to enhance the dramatic effect of the quotation.

(35)  
\[
\text{lo-ko} \quad \text{mamok} \quad \text{ata}
\]
\[
3\text{Fsg-LINK+Fsg} \quad \text{elder_sibling+LINK+DAT} \quad \text{then}
\]
\[
wa-lo-l \quad a-lo \quad du
\]
[pause]
\[
say-3\text{Fsg.SUBJ.P}-3\text{Fsg.OBJ.P} \quad \text{DEM.DIST-Msg} \quad \text{man}
\]
[pause]
\[
wun \quad k\text{ota} \quad an-a:m \quad k\text{o-k\text{o}r}
\]
\[
1\text{sg:DIR.SP.REP} \quad \text{now} \quad 1\text{du-LINK+OBJ:IND.SP.REP} \quad \text{eat-DES}
\]
\[
\text{ata} \quad wa-na-d
\]

thus say-\text{ACT.FOC-3Msg.SUBJ.NP}

‘She said to her elder sister thus: “That man; ‘I, want to eat us now’

(he,]) said”’ (Aikhenvald 2008: 395)

A final and summarizing observation about the category of person in quotative constructions is that effects observed in the source construction in
the preceding examples, at least in English, also apply to the addressee as
encoded in the source construction: compare (36a-h).

(36a) I said I would come > highlighting commitment to truth
(36b) You said you would come¹⁴ > request for commitment to truth
(36c) He said he would come > suspension of commitment to truth
(36d) I said to you/him I would come > inviting inference about truth
(36e) You said to me/him you would come > inviting inference about truth
(36f) He said to me he would come > highlighting status of message: report
(36g) He said to you he would come > inviting inference about truth
(36h) He said to him he would come > suspension of commitment to truth

¹⁴ Pragmatic stress on the speech verb might invite the inference of lying a bit too strongly in direct address possibly making the stress pattern ‘You said you would come’ more natural, but for the sake of exposition and parallelism between (36a-h) I will adhere here to similar patterns for (36a-c) and (36d-h). Politeness likely plays a similar role in what Evans (fc.) calls ‘second person magnetism’.
First person reported speakers (36a) invite the inference ‘I am saying it so it is true’, and first person reported addressees invite the inference ‘as far as I know it is true’ (36f). Second person reference in the source construction invites either a request to the reported speaker to recommit to the truth of the message (36b) or to invite some inference about the truth of the message (36d,g), for example, highlighting the status of the reported message as a promise or suggesting that the reported speaker might provide a different message to the reported addressee than to someone else (i.e. contrastive stress). Reported speakers or reported addressees other than current discourse participants (i.e., 36c, h) have no truth enhancing effect, but rather suspend commitment to the truth of the message on behalf of the current speaker. Prosodic prominence of the reported addressee in the form of contrastive stress invites the inference ‘the reported speaker might have given this message to this reported addressee, but could have said something else to some other addressee’, that is, the message may not be reliable. At least for the languages I have been able to survey here, all these meanings seem to arise primarily from pragmatic inference which entails that they may be cancelled in non-default contexts.

The representation in (37) may be taken as an illustration of the inferential processes reported so far. Inferential processes are always calculated from the perspective of the current speaker, that is, the discourse entity making the report. As she is necessarily present, this layer of evaluation is always present. A second layer of evaluation is that of the
reported speaker. The next layer in the representation in (37) is that of the evaluation itself, which may or may not be explicitly expressed. I hypothesize that when the evaluation is not made explicit, an evaluation about the truth of the message is implied. In cases where the two outer layers are discourse participants, the commitment to the truth is strengthened; if the reported speaker is not a discourse participant (i.e., 3rd person), commitment to the truth is suspended. The innermost layer is that of the message itself, the ‘other-discourse element’. Constructions highlighting this layer do not primarily evaluate the message but signal lack of responsibility for uttering the information contained in it, although the embedded structure in (37) implies that this cannot be done without some evaluation of the message (e.g., suspension of commitment to the truth).\(^{15}\) The round brackets in (37) should distinguish the elements in this representation form the meaning-form complexes in the representations above: As I have aimed to show, current speaker-evaluative meanings arise in the complex interaction of the semantic elements in (37), although the constructions in (26a-f) do not correspond one-to-one to any of the meanings in (37).

(37) (Current speaker (Evaluating discourse entity (Evaluation (Message)))))

\(^{15}\) Following Tom Güldemann’s definition of reportative discourse as an act of ‘distancing’ (Güldemann, this volume), this distancing may be conceptualized on these two levels.
I am assuming that the meanings ‘suspension of commitment to the truth of the message’ and explicitly doubting the message are different (also compare the inferential scale (27) in section 4.2). The exact nature of this distinction is yet to be described.

4.5 Evidentiality in quotation

As indicated above, my approach to evidentiality in quotative constructions differs slightly from the treatment in, for example, Aikhenvald (2004), where the only evidential category relevant to quotation is a single evidential category ‘reportative’. I explicitly assume that quotative constructions do not represent a single evidential value, but may express several different evidential types. One way in which this may be done is exemplified in this section: the combination of evidential morphemes with a source construction.

Ten of the twenty five languages in the sample display grammaticalized reportativity, either with verbal inflection, a verbal suffix or a particle encoding a general type of quotation (mostly ‘hearsay’). This is a considerably higher number than the languages which have fully developed evidential systems, and encode other types of sources of information (e.g., visual, non-visual, sensory) as well (5/25). Currently, little is known about the specific combinatory features of reportative markers and evidential markers. Evidence from Tariana suggests that even though non-
reportative evidential markers are not generally stacked, reportative markers may combine with other types of evidential markers (Aikhenvald 2003).16

A similar observation can be made for Duna. Most quotative constructions in San Roque (2008) indeed combine a *verbum dicendi* or reportative marker with an evidential marker. Compare, for example, the Duna quotative constructions (38) and (39), which feature the visual evidential suffix *-tia* and the sensory evidential suffix *-yanua* respectively.

(38) *Lepani Mospi nga-nda ri-tia-na,*

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PSN} & \quad \text{PLN} & \quad \text{go-INT} & \quad \text{say-PFV.VIS.P-SPEC} \\
\text{lie=HYP=Q} & \\
\text{ene=koae,} & \quad \text{ko waki po=pe} \\
\text{true=HYP} & \quad \text{2SG hear do.PFV=Q} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘Lepani is going to Moresby [people] said, I wonder could it be false or true, have you heard?’ (San Roque 2008: 430)

(39) *ko inginiwane akita ri-yanua*

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{2SG} & \quad \text{offspring} & \quad \text{how.many} & \quad \text{say-SNS.IMPL} \\
\end{align*}
\]

16 Lila San Roque points out that combining evidential and modal markers is not an uncommon phenomenon in languages with grammaticalized evidential morphology and rightly stresses that there are (at least) three distinct possible semantic effects for quotative constructions: the evidential is just there to mark the quotative construction (the evidential indicates that there is a report), the evidential takes scope over the report (e.g., I report that someone saw *p*) or the evidential is ‘inside’ the report (e.g., I saw someone report *p*) (Lila San Roque, p.c.). The Duna examples in (38) and (39) appear to be of the type ‘evidential inside a quotative construction’, and this seems the most likely type to find current speaker-evaluative meanings in.
‘How many children do you have? [she] says.’ (San Roque 2008: 419)

Example (38) appears to illustrate the default evidential marking in quotations in Duna. Although San Roque (2008: 430) suggests that the visual evidential marker might have some modal overtones for some speakers, evidential markers primarily relate to the physical world, in this case the reported utterance *as a speech signal*. We might interpret the visual evidential marker in (38) as placing the current speaker in the reported speech situation as an observer. The reported speech situation in (39) is slightly different. Example (39) represents a translation, that is, the utterance is relayed to the original addressee of the utterance by a different speaker in a different language. The current speaker indicates his role as an interpreter in the reported speech situation by suffixing a sensory evidential marker.

For West-Greenlandic, Fortescue (1984: 294) reports that an affix (classified as ‘authority of assertion’ in the Routledge descriptive grammar series) is used ‘to indicate that the speaker did not witness and event himself but accepts the report as reliable’, but no examples of quotative constructions are given in the grammar.

### 4.6 Modal categories

As I briefly sketched in section 3, definitions of modality and related notions are notoriously diverse and, accordingly, descriptions in grammars
of the sample languages are exceedingly varied. For example, Lichtenberk (2008: 754) defines mood as “[…] expressions of modality that are not purely lexical”, which would include markers such as the speaker conclusion suffix in Semelai (3), the dubitative marker in Lele (2) and all irrealis inflections. In this study I interpret mood as the grammatical expression of illocutionary categories such as questions, commands, suggestions, although this definition does not necessarily solve all semantic and morphological ambiguities either (see also the discussion below). A popular way of understanding the distinction between mood, modality and illocution in functionalist theories of grammar is through a layered clause structure analysis, where modality is predicated at the level of states of affairs (SoA) and mood at the level of utterances (cf. Dik 1997; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997). One clear problem of such an approach, and with a strict structural modality-mood distinction more generally, is that it is contrived for languages that use identical markers both at utterance level and at the level of SoAs, as will be exemplified in section 4.6.

For our present purposes we may take a relatively naïve approach to modality: modality in quotation is the encoding of an evaluation of a message. This definition fully recognizes that both the message construction (predicating a proposition flagged as a discourse element of some other speaker) and the speaker-evaluative meaning/speaker attitude take on a range of structural guises. Modal markers are notoriously hard to identify, as these may not be straightforwardly distinguished from other grammatical
categories. For example, in many languages there are complex interactions and overlaps between tense forms and modal meanings (cf. Comrie 1985: 23-25, 45) and it is not uncommon that what some authors analyze as modal markers expressing, for example, ‘shared knowledge’ is interpreted as tense forms, such as ‘general past’ by others (cf. San Roque, 2008: 350). Ameka (1991: 129) reports that the ingressive aspect marker in Ewe may also be used to express a very similar meaning to the ‘frustrative’ modal, which is introduced below.

There is a more direct link between evaluative meanings and time: the semantics of many modals may be represented on a timeline of two moments of evaluation such as observed in ‘mistaken belief’ markers (this is a characteristic modals and quotative constructions share). I will highlight two such categories from the sample in this section: the frustrative and the mirative.

The ‘frustrative’, which has been identified for Jarawara, Kwaza and Toqabaqita indicates “[…] that the action was done to no avail – that is, the desired result was not achieved” (Dixon 2000: 293). The category has a double referential relationship between a moment $t_1$ at which some discourse entity has some intention and a moment $t_0$ at which this intention has failed to materialize. The examples from Kwaza make it especially clear that this category interacts in a striking way with quotative constructions: see (40).
As the translation ‘in vain’ already indicates, the frustrative-plus-quotative combination may either mean that the reported speaker does not succeed in performing the speech act (e.g., because the addressee did not hear him), or that the speech act did not have the intended effect.

A category even more closely related to quotative constructions is the mirative: in Turkish, the marker -miş, which has a mirative interpretation, can equally be used to encode hearsay, a pattern also reported for Bulgarian. Compare for example (41).

(41)  
Kemal gel-miş
K come-MIRATIVE
‘Kemal came’ (Slobin and Akşu 1982 cited in Delancy (1997: 37)

Example (41) may be interpreted as either ‘They say Kemal came’ or (if the context makes it sufficiently clear that every participant in the speech situation is aware that Kemal did come) that the speaker was not expecting the expressed proposition, that is, something like ‘What do you know,
Kemal came!’ In this latter sense, the ‘mirative’ (see Delancy 1997) is an ‘unprepared mind’ marker, not dissimilar to the ‘mistaken belief’ marker in (22). It describes an evaluation moment $t_1$ at which the speaker had some expectation and a moment $t_0$ at which this expectation was disproved. A similar modal category in Korean is termed ‘appreciative’ in Sohn (1994); Kruspe (2004: 289) also indicates that the irrealis in Semelai may be marginally used as a mirative as well.

Although the primary meaning of the frustrative (and arguably also the mirative) is not necessarily epistemic, both categories require a factive reading: the evaluation moment $t_0$ has to reflect a fact. Thus, by applying these categories in a quotative construction, the current speaker necessarily expresses that she believes the conveyed message to be true.

The most widespread modal category in the sample is the irrealis, although the range of its application in the languages varies, as do extended meanings. Ngarinyin appears to be among the most consistent irrealis languages, encoding all non-real world events with an irrealis marker, including all negative clauses (a feature it shares with many Australian languages). In many languages, irrealis markers are said to have overtones of disbelief, but these appear to be inferential rather than semantic and I have found no cases in the sample in which they encode current speaker-evaluative meanings. It seems likely, though, that the irrealis may perform this function in some languages. In addition, however, in sample languages that do contain grammaticalized dubitative markers it appears that all
subjects in complex sentence examples are co-referential with those in the framing clause (and thus in quotative constructions that describe evaluations by the reported speaker), except for the already cited Lele (2).

The main conclusion that can be derived from columns MI1 and MI2 appears to be that the number of modal distinctions is not indicative of the presence of current speaker-evaluative meanings. For example, the sample language with the widest range of modal categories, Kolyma Yukaghir, does not seem to be able to encode speaker evaluative meanings using modal markers. On the other hand, languages without modal inflection (i.e., sample languages for which the MI1 and MI2 columns are not filled) may well encode many of the meanings described in this section, including speaker evaluative meanings periphrastically, for example, through complementation strategies. The flexibility of the periphrastic strategy has been most explicitly noted for Japanese: “A sentence can be quoted by adding the particle ｔｏ ‘(says/thinks) that’. [...] The sentence quoted can be negative, desiderative etc.; it can be perfect, tentative, etc.; and the quotational verb that follows can undergo all conversions independently of the quoted sentence” (Martin 1975: 996). This is an intriguing observation, of which the full semantic consequences are yet to be systematically described. Yet, with respect to columns MI1 and MI2 it does indicate that focusing solely on languages displaying rich modal inflection and particles when searching for current speaker-evaluative meanings in quotation, as one might be inclined to do guided by languages like Lele, would be myopic.
A similar conclusion applies to the remaining columns; each indicates a likely candidate for the expression of speaker-evaluations, but no explicit examples were found in the grammars consulted. I consider whether correlations exist between the number of constructions available for the expression of (epistemic/epistemic-deontic) speaker attitudes in a language and the expressibility of current speaker-evaluative meanings in quotation an interesting research question. However, the current survey has not yet unveiled such correlations.

4.7 *Illocution and some remaining observations*

A category that I did not examine in the survey in table 2 is illocution, although there are some indications that illocutionary markers may play a role in the encoding of current speaker-evaluative meanings. One reason is that the task of defining illocution separately from mood and modality is complex, and grammars choose different cut-off points for different languages. For example, Jung (1971: 238) and Frajzyngier (2001: 5) define mood (such as declarative, imperative, interrogative etc.) in terms of notions such as ‘speaker certainty’, or belief in the truth of the encoded proposition (e.g., Frajzyngier 2001: 5; see also Palmer 1986: 9-33 for discussion). These definitions are almost indistinguishable from, for example, John Searle’s definition of ‘assertives’, one of the five illocutionary acts he distinguishes:
“assertives [are] where we tell our hearers (truly or falsely) how things are” (cited from Palmer 1986: 13).

However there are languages with much more fine-grained illocutionary distinctions than English, for example, Lezgian, which has explicitly encoded non-declarative categories such as imperative, prohibitive, hortative, optative and interrogative (Haspelmath 1993: 149-152). Such specific categories defy straightforward cross-linguistic classifications. More importantly, in a language like Toqabaqita, grammatical markers that in some contexts encode modality, in some other contexts directly seem to specify speech acts, indicating that teasing out these ‘levels’ is slightly artificial in the language, at least on structural grounds. Similar connections between mood and modality might also be seen in modal categories such as ‘intentive’ and ‘desiderative’ in San Roque (2008: 284) and a declarative-assertive marker that Aikhenvald (2003: 398) distinguishes in Tariana.

Consider (42a, b). In (42a) the ‘timitive mood’ marker is part of a construction that roughly conveys ‘lest you touch the ants’, a cautionary speech act, whereas in (43b) it designates the speaker’s state of mind/evaluation.

(42a) lio fas=i faar-a ada ta fuufusi ka
look PREC=LOC underneath TIM some ant 3SG.SEQ

too-too qani-a
‘Look first underneath [the piece of timber], in case there are ants there’ (Lichtenberk 2008: 786)

(42b) ada dani ka qaru
TIM rain 3SG.SEQ fall
‘It might/may rain’ (Lichtenberk 2008: 787)

A similar example can be found in (43a,b), where Lichtenberk glosses the marker qoko as ‘obligation’ in (43a) and ‘I guess’ in (43b).

(43a) qoko lae toqo boqo
2SG.SEQ go OBLIG INTS
‘You should, must go’ (Lichtenberk 2008: 196)

(43b) too ba-d=i sa-muluqa toqo
neri
stay LIM-3PL.PERS=LOC ADJC-2PL.PERS I.guess NPAST.HERE
‘I guess [they] are staying with you (are they?)’ (Lichtenberk 2008: 772)

The illocutionary force of (43a) appears to arise from the combination of direct address (second person) and the intensifying/assertive marker, and possibly other factors such as prosody, identifying (43a) as a command (cf.
This illocutionary force is absent in (43b), and the particle *toqo* assumes the modal function ‘possibility’.

In Kolyma Yukaghir, Malsova observes that questions may be used to “[…] negate the proposition expressed by the clause, or to present it as doubtful’ (Maslova 2003: 487) and the optative particle plus nominal resultative inflection expresses “[…] that the situation is strongly desired [by the speaker], yet [she] cannot bring it about’ (Maslova 2003: 490). Sohn (1994) similarly indicates that questions are used for a wide range of pragmatic functions (none of which are necessarily modal). What these examples show is that searching for current speaker-evaluative meanings requires a full appreciation of the complex interactions between mood, modality and illocution. Under an analysis in which quotative utterances frame discourse and reported messages are utterances rather than propositions (cf. McGregor 1994), it should not be surprising that illocutionary markers play a role in the encoding of speaker evaluative meanings. An initial impression is that complementizers are a category that is particularly prone to moving between modal and illocutionary in the context of quotative constructions, for example, through grammaticalization processes such as described in Frajzyngier (1995) and Evans (2007).

4.8 Summary of the preceding sections
In the preceding sections the results of the typological survey of the languages in table 1 were summarized in two ways: by their expression (form/function) in the quotative construction (section 4.2) and by their grammatical function (sections 4.3-4.7). The complementizer construction and the message construction were identified as the main constructions expressing speaker-evaluative meanings but are certainly not the only part of the quotative construction encoding speaker attitudes. With respect to the grammatical categories that were shown to play a role in the encoding of speaker attitudes in quotation such as person, evidentiality, modality and mood are several areas requiring further research. In section 4.4 examples were introduced showing how evidential categories may be used to refer to the message as forming part of a physical utterance; in section 4.5 examples of how modal categories may be used to explicitly encode speaker attitudes were introduced.

5 A method for the typological analysis of speaker attitudes in quotative constructions

Although understanding and anticipating the perspectives of other discourse participants are essential for acquiring and using a language (cf. Tomasello 2003), the only perspective we have to contribute to the discourse is our own. This is a realization that has to be observed while studying current
speaker-evaluative meanings; even ‘objectively’ reported messages reflect how the current speaker perceives the reported message. A quotative construction does not directly reflect the mind of the reported speaker; it represents the mind of the reported speaker through that of the current speaker. As a result, current speaker evaluations are an inalienable part of the semantics of a quotative construction and we may call this the inherent modality of quotative constructions.

Objectivity versus subjectivity in quotation lies at the heart of the traditional opposition between *de dicto* and *de re* interpretations: consider (44).

(44) Oedipus said that his mother was beautiful

Ever since Quine (1956), it has been observed that an indirect speech construction, as in (44), may encode either a faithful reflection of the reported speaker’s words (a *de dicto* interpretation) or a rephrasing of the contents of those words in such a way as to preserve their referential value (a *de re* interpretation). Given our knowledge of Greek mythology, we will find it unlikely that Oedipus phrased the message as in the embedded clause in (44), leading to interpreting (44) as a *de re* rendition of an original utterance such as “Jocasta is beautiful”. In more recent studies of quotation the notions *de dicto* and *de re* generally have received less attention, presumably due to the clear non-universality of indirect speech (also pointed
out in Coulmas 1986) and the finding that quotatives generally do not represent literal repeats of the reported speaker’s words, so that even purportedly *de dicto* utterances are not a faithful rendition of the original speaker’s words. Yet should this mean the *de dicto*/*de re* opposition has lost relevance? My answer would be no, although I would have to redefine the distinction in order to make it compatible with the analysis pursued here. In my present proposal the key notion in this redefinition is evidentiality.

Although to date, relatively little research has addressed the topic of evidentiality in quotative constructions, the original speech moment has always been a central concern in accounts of quotation. In order to interpret a reported message, the addressee needs to have some indication about the relation of the current speaker to the discourse context she is reporting about; this is exactly the communicative aspect that has grammaticalized in the category of evidentiality. The behavior of this category in quotative constructions may give us a more meaningful view on the semantics of quotative constructions than classical direct/indirect speech oppositions or traditional interpretations of *de dicto* and *de re*, and examples like in Duna, (38) and (39), are a case in point. What has lead to the often reported intuition that some quotative constructions are a more ‘accurate’ reflection of a reported speech situation than others is, I claim, due to the *evidential value* of the quotative construction. Some evidential values may reflect that the current speaker was a discourse participant in the reported speech situation (prototypically the addressee) and fully represents herself as such.
at the speech moment $t_0$. For lack of a better term, we may define the evidential value as the degree of *mental contact* the current speaker has with the reported speech situation. If this mental contact is direct, the current speaker places herself fully in the reported discourse situation and we may expect that the quotative construction reflects the reported message as accurately as possible. If mental contact is less direct, the addressee may infer that the current speaker was a less prototypical discourse participant in the reported speech situation (e.g., she overheard the message) and/or that the reported message is more likely to have been rephrased by the current speaker.

However, no matter how accurately and objectively the current speaker aims to convey the reported message, she is the one speaking and may be assumed to have evaluated the message. This observation leads to inherent modality, but inherent modality may be overridden or specified with an encoded *modal value* through one of the strategies as surveyed in section 4.2. We may assume, as does Frajzyngier (1995, 2001), that if a language allows several strategies, the unmarked strategy will generally signal agreement with the truth of the reported message: compare the implicational scale in (27). The main definitions of values and constructions that are reflected in quotative constructions are summarized in (45).

(45)  *Evidential value*: Indicates the degree of mental contact the current speaker has with the reported speech situation at speech moment $t_0$. 
Modal value: Evaluation of the current speaker of the relationship between the reported speaker and some proposition \( p = 19 \).

Source construction: Represents the reported speaker in the reported speech situation.

Reported message construction: A proposition the current speaker presents as a discourse element of some other speaker.

Two questions remain: How can evidential and modal values be determined and how do the elements in (45) relate to one another?

As mentioned in section 1, the term construction as used here needs to be understood as in constructionist approaches to grammar, that is, as a conventionalized pairing of meaning and form (Croft 2001; Goldberg 1995, 2006; Tomasello 2003; also see Vandelanotte, this volume). The semantic representation of a quotative construction necessarily requires the elements in (45): see (46):

(46) Quotative construction

\[
[[\text{SOURCE construction}] \ (\text{modal value}) \ [\text{MESSAGE construction}]_{\text{evidential value}}]
\]

In words: a quotative construction combines a source construction, a message construction and a (semantic) modal value in a semantic-structural complex which expresses an evidential value. The semantic structure in (46)
is non-hierarchical, but it represents the analysis that when all elements between the square brackets are present with the values as conventionalized in a particular language, they are part of a quotative construction, which means that they represent a particular evidential value. Quotative constructions may differ in the way in which either of these constructions and values is represented, that is, when there exists an opposition in a language between quotative constructions, we may expect that languages make distinctions either in the representation of the source, in the representation of the message, the modal value or the evidential value. In other words, the different structures in which modal and evidential values grammaticalize shape the different quotative constructions in a particular language, although there may be some discourse functional motivations for representing the source or reported message constructions differently. For example, Frajzyngier (2001: 375) observes that in Lele “[t]he choice between direct speech and indirect speech is an issue not merely of style but rather of resolving the potential ambiguity between the participants of the reported speech and the participants of the ongoing speech.” Discourse functional motivations may require particular quotative constructions, which means that a different representation of the source or reported message constructions does not necessarily have to indicate different modal or evidential values, although this might generally be expected. Some of the structures to which this semantic representation may be paired were considered in section 4.
When applying this analysis in a particular language the first step is to determine the number of quotative constructions (i.e., the number of semantic and structural oppositions between constructions encoding quotation), and secondly, the way in which the modal and evidential values and the representation of the source and message in the construction differ. Let us assume that (47a-e) (= 16a-e) are the quotative constructions in English. The primary semantic opposition between (47a), (47b) and (47d) lies in their evidential value, from more to less direct, where (47a) purportedly expresses the message ‘as said’, (47b) may still specify the way in which the message was conveyed ‘originally’ but is paraphrased, and (47d) may not even specify the way in which the current speaker learned about the message (e.g., the current speaker may just infer that the reported speaker was thinking the reported message).

(47a) He said: “I am here”

(47b) He said (that) he was there

(47c) He maintained (that) he was there

(47d) He went like, “I am here”

(47e) According to him he was there

Examples (47a,b,c) seem to mainly contrast with respect to their modal value. Where (47a) excludes the possibility of co-encoding a current speaker attitude (e.g., prosodic stress on the framing verb does not result in a modal
meaning), in (47b) there appears to be room for a modal interpretation, as evidenced by (47c), seemingly the same construction with a different speech verb, which implies non-commitment to the truth of the message. The source construction in example (47e) contrasts with those in (47a-d), which might be motivated by referential or other discourse factors.

Although the modal and evidential values are independent in the representation, it may be assumed that a general tendency in languages is that if current speakers express a stronger evaluation of a message (i.e., the construction has a marked modal value), the message is more likely to be less represented as if the current speaker is directly relaying the message from the perspective of the reported speech situation (i.e., the construction less likely expresses an evidential value that suggests direct mental contact with the reported speech situation). However, this is by no means always the case, nor is it a necessary conceptual correlation. For example, a construction encoding a meaning such as ‘Can you believe s/he told this blatantly obvious lie?’ will most probably present the reported message as a directly relayed utterance.

6 Some closing remarks: semantics and pragmatics

In this chapter I have aimed to show that the analysis of quotation necessarily includes meanings of source information and evaluation, the
grammaticalized counterparts of which are the categories of evidentiality and modality. A cross-linguistic account of quotative constructions is well served by examining the behavior of these categories in quotation in order to discover and reinterpret periphrastic strategies in other languages that otherwise may have gone unnoticed, and also by eventually predicting grammaticalization paths.

The present account has focused on constructions, that is, grammatical realizations of meaning. It remains to be demonstrated how modal and evidential values in quotative constructions are employed in quotative utterances, that is, how quotative constructions correlate with the usage of quotation in discourse (cf. Larson 1978; Vincent and Perrin 1999).

In a fine-grained account of Aguaruna (Peru; Jivaroan) texts, Larson (1978) distinguishes seven usage categories with up to seven different subtypes; Vincent and Perrin (1999) identify the following four functions in their French corpus: ‘Narrative’ (advancing the story), ‘Appreciative’ (evaluations), ‘Authority’ (arguments of authority) and ‘Support’ (arguments of exemplification). The last three, they maintain, are either motivated on an emotional or rhetorical basis (Vincent and Perrin 1999: 293). I would argue, however, that a discourse account of quotation crucially relies on the semantics of the constructions employed, and that relevant correlations between discourse function and types of construction can only be properly determined if the meaning of the latter is firmly established. Also, by studying grammatical realizations of pragmatic
functions in quotation we may shed light on the cross-linguistic pragmatics of quotative constructions under the assumption that pragmatics precedes semantics in grammaticalization.

This is not to deny that the occurrence of certain quotative constructions is highly reliant on such notions as discourse context or hearer expectancy, that is, the speaker’s ability to anticipate what the addressee will understand as a ‘normal’ continuation of the discourse. Given a particular context, certain constructions may gain, for example, a certain modal meaning, while others are perceived as neutral contributions. This is especially true for current speaker-evaluative meanings. If a speaker is asking for a fact and her discourse participant provides her with a third person quotative construction, she may conclude that the speaker is uncertain about the information. Similarly, if a speaker uses a quotative construction with a less direct evidential value than might be expected, pragmatic effects might be triggered. However, just as we cannot recognize these contexts without studying the psycho-social construction of discourse, we may also not recognize the constructional semantics that are enabling these discourse meanings if we do not have a proper understanding of the semantics of quotative constructions. This was the topic I aimed to address in the present chapter.

Examining speaker attitudes in quotative constructions remains a largely unexplored area in descriptive and theoretical linguistics, despite a number of pioneering studies that the present account is heavily indebted to.
What I hope to have demonstrated, however, is that further research into this topic will not only contribute to a better understanding of such categories as modality and evidentiality, but also of such core concepts of linguistics as clause-hood (in examining the scope and syntactic status of current speaker framed evaluative meanings) and referentiality (by studying who is the evaluating discourse participant and how that meaning is established). I hope to have presented a viable framework for analyzing the respective parameters that need to be taken into account for studying this fascinating topic.

References


Evans, Nicholas. forthcoming. “Some problems in the typology of quotation: a canonical approach.”


